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Case No. 6380

In the Supreme Court
of the

State of Utah
R. D. TOBI"S, indi,idually, and R. D. TOBIN, as attorney
in fact for ,-.-olney Anderson, et al.,
Respondents)
vs.
"GXITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORATION, a
corporation; \V. R. BECKSTEAD, as President of
said corporation; BOYD EVANS, as Secretary of
said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, BOYD
E,;_A_SS, LESLIE D. SPILSBURY, et al., as Directors of said corporation; W. R. BECKSTEAD, individually, and STELLA BECKSTEAD, his wife, EGBERT PANDOLFO, BECKSTEAD LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, a corporation, and INVESTORS
THRIFT COl\IP ANY, a corporation,
Appellants.

ilrief of mespou~entn
Appeal from the District Court of the Third
Judicial District) Salt Lake County
Herbert 111. Schiller) J~tdge
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondents here (plaintiffs in the court below) are
stockholders and owners and holders of units of investment of United Bond and Finance Corporation.
The defendants below (appellants here) are United
Bond and Finance Corporation, its subsidiaries, officers
and agents.
Plaintiffs, charging mismanagement on the part of defendants, commenced this suit in equity, 1) to have the
rights and status of the stockholders determined; 2) to
have the defendants

W~

R,. Beckstead and Beckstead Live-

stock Company adjudged trustees of the property standing
in their names, but belonging to United Bond and Finance
corporation; 3) to have defendants render an accounting
of the assets and property of the corporation; 4) to enjoin
the filing and prosecuting of any further actions against
United Bond and Financ.e Corporation involving or affecting its property; 5) to restrain the defendant W. R.
Beckstead from encumbering or disposing of any of the
assets of the corporation, and 6) for the appointment of
a receiver (See prayer to plaintiffs' complaint herein).
A trial was had resulting in decree for the plaintiff
stockholders and investors.
Defendants have appealed.
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-3CONTROVERTED STATEMENTS
~i

number of stHtements appearing under the "State-

ment of Facts" in
pellants~

1)

brief pp.

appellants~
1-S~

brief are controverted. (Ap-

Rule '"'"III).

This action "·as not brought for the single pur-

pose of ha-\ing a ·•receirer appointed-'' (App. Br. 1, 2).
Injunctive relief, an accounting and other forms of relief
are prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint and in the prayer
thereof.
2)

stock

It is not conceded that ((a reserve for common

u~as

set up and 1naintained by the corpora.tion" on

units sold for sums in excess of $125 (App. Br. 3).
3)

In selling the corporation's stock, W. R. Beck-

stead, like every other salesman of the corporation, used
((his own

(tuton~obile')

( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194, 1228, 1229,

1643) but he most certainly did not use ((his own resources

to fi.n(uzce the venture)' (App. Br. 3).
Beckstead~s

testimony is that he did not have any

money to put into the venture (Tr. 1227).

He received

commissions on each and every unit of stock sold by anyone and from this source he was handsomely and well paid
for all services he rendered in the stock-selling campaign
( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194). He made as much as fifteen thousand dollars a year ( Tr. 1653).
As soon as the selling of stock ceased, in 1931, Beckstead commenced to draw a salary from the corporation,
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-4first receiving $200 per month and later he raised his salary
to $100 per week, which amount he is now drawing (Tr.
1035, 1197, 1198).
4)

Beckstead did not invest the corporation's ((1noney

in accordance with the corporate purpose)) ( App. Br. 3)
and he did not do aall things necessary to keep the assets of

the corporation invested in interest bearing securities))
(App. Br. 4).
6)

The corporation did change aits business activ-

ities)) and it did abandon its corporate purposes as an investment company but such changes of purpose and modification of aits business

activitie~)

were not occasioned by

the depression, nor were same done to prevent insolvency
(App. Br. 4).
7)

It was not ((impossible for the corporation to pay

dividends)) and the stockholders did not voluntwrily commence ((trading and exchanging their stock to stock traders

for stock in other
selling it for

corporatiofJ~S

~Dhatever

and other sec1trities and

price could be obtained)) (App.

Br. 5).
The facts are that even before the corporation was
organized Beckstead had in mind the purchase and trading
by the corporation for its own stock, and although this was
and still is illegal Beckstead made provisions for such
purchases and trading in the original articles of in corporation.
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-5From the Yery beginning of the corporation and continuing during the entire stock-selling campaign thereof,
to July, 1931, the corporation regularly paid "dividends"
on its stock.
Only a thorough accounting 'Yill show the sources
from 'Yhich these

'~dividends''

came and whether or not

they represented actual earnings or 'vhether or not they
"~ere

in truth and fact but "sucker bait" paid as "come-on

dividends" sent out to encourage the unsuspecting stockholders to continue sending in their installment payments
on subscribed stock.
The depression simply furnished Beckstead with an
excuse and "yith an alibi for discontinuing the paying out
of so-called "dividends", and to dishearten and discourage
his stockholders and make them easy prey for a crew of
unscrupulous, glib-tongued traders and stock "pickers"
whom Beckstead supplied with "sucker lists" giving the
names and addresses of his stockholders.

By these means

the stockholders whom Beckstead deemed "would be very
gullible'' ( Tr. 150) "rere contacted and traded out of their
stock in the "Cnited Bond for worthless stock, interests
and paper in other concerns.
It was dangerous for Beckstead, occupying the position he did in the corporation, to deal openly and directly
·with such "stock pickers" as Egbert Pandolfo ( Tr.

l~a,

156, 633, 1056), Art 3Iadsen (Tr. 634-642), Paradis (Tr.
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-6213-216), 0. P. Pearce ( Tr. 54, 218, 225, 242-453) and a
long list of others (Tr. 1047-1058), hence, when the stock
"pickers" procured the stock endorsed in blank from the
stockholders, the practice was to dispose of same througll

.'1

certain stock brokers and traders in Sale Lake City, rather

1,d11

than dealing directly with Beckstead.

~~.

Beckstead would then make his deal for this "hot"
stock directly with the stock broker and by this method
he was able to divorce himself from official and first-hand
knowledge of the wholesale Bwindles which were being
perpetrated upon his stockholders whereby they were
traded out of their holdings in his corporation.
Thus it is clear that the trading in stock came not

i/

((as a result of this condition)) ( App. Br. 5) called the depression, but it came through the deliberate planned
scheme of Beckstead to freeze out his stockholders, wrest
from them their stock, and then, at the proper time, to
convert all the corporation's assets to his individual use
and profit.
8)

The stockholders were not ((willing to sell the

stock for a

s~mall

percentage of its par or book value)) ( App.

Br. 5), but due to the systematic and habitual evil practices of Beckstead, and due to the false and fraudulent
representations made to his stockholders, they were led
to believe that the corporation was insolvent and that their
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·.~

-7holdil!~·s

had no value, as is shtnYn in the typical rase of

:Jrirs. )layn1e ''"'ilson ( Tr.

203-~-!1,

250-266, 338-355).

The evidence does not establish that the Wyon1ing

9)

,(ranches are being operated in a S'nccessful and efficient
manner·· (.A.pp. Br. 6) .
\Yith assets of the

.~AJl

l~nited

these ranches were purchased
Bond and Finance.

In 1935

Beckstead, indiridually, took title by deed to three of
these ranches, "'vhich deeds were recorded; the title remained in Beckstead's name, indiDidzu1-lly, for about three
years.

Had Beckstead died in the meantime the ranches

most certainly would have been a part of his estate and
title thereto would have passed to his heirs.
Numerous stockholders protested these deals and
when the heat

"~as

applied Beckstead promptly organized

a Wyoming corporation, 'vhich he called Beckstead Livestock Company.

To this Wyoming corporation he then

deeded the ranches, but first he had issued to himself,

individually, all but two of the 50,000 shares constituting
the capital stock of that corporation and later, when more
heat 'vas

applied~

Beckstead got busy and transferred his

stock in the Wyoming corporation to United Bond and
Finance. The latter company has never been paid for its
assets and funds used in acquiring the ranches and the
ranches are not profitable ventures, but are being operated
at a large annual loss ( Tr. 1019, 1029).
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-810)

Likewise, the evidence does not establish the

mortgage indebtedness on the ranches as ('being appro.r·imately $13)700.00)) (App. Br. 6).

The affairs of the two

corporations are entirely too interwoven, intermingled and
scrambled to determine, except by and through a thorough
accounting, the amount of indebtedness of either the Beckstead Livestock Company or of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation.
No one can tell whether the United Bond is solvent or
not.

The books and records of the corporation are in the

possession of Beckstead.

Some of the records of the cor-

poration are missing and have been destroyed.

The only

access the plaintiffs have had to the books or records is
when a part or portion thereof were produced in court
during the trial.
The United Bond and Finance has sold no stock since
1931. It has virtually gone out of the investment business.
'Vhen trading the stockholders out of their stock Beckstead, his associates: and agents have represented the corporation as being insolvent) but when they come into court
they about face and represent the corporation as being
solvent. What is the truth? The true financial condition
of these corporations will come to light and be kno\vn only
after a complete accounting is had.
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" (App. Br. 1-8) is
entirely too meagre and too hastily drafted to inform the
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-9court of the

t:~s~entinl

and n1nterial facts and issues that are

here inYolved. Hence, to

suppl~·

the necessary information

to this court respondents are setting forth herein a more
comprehensive statement of the case than appears in the
brief of appellants.
Transcript Page References

XOTE:

Transcript page references herein are as

pages are nu,mbered -in carbon copy of transcript supplied
us by officia,l court reporter.

In preparing brief

~oe

do

not hatie access to the transcript filed in this court. Should
the page ruunbers differ) a table can be submitted indicating the corresponding page numbers in the official tran-

script.

THE FACTS
UNITED STATES BOND AND FINANCE
CORPORATION

'V. R. Beckstead, W. A. Green and Floyd S. Bradshaw,
three brothers-in-lalC) (Tr. 1225, 1648) in September, 1927,

organized the original corporation, which they called
·enited States Bond and Finance Corporation (Tr. 15,
1034, 1196, 1225-1227, 1235, 1651).

The na1ne of the corporation, commencing, as it did,
"·ith the "·ords "United States", was fraudulent in design
anu purpose and constituted spurious advertising, in vio-
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l'ation of the federal la-\YS (See ch. 377 of the Act of Congress of May 24, 1926, sees. 1 to 4, incl. ; 44 Stat. 628;
Title 12, U. S. C. A., sees. 584-587).
The trio of brothers-in-law immediately climbed in the
corporation saddle, with Beckstead as president, Green as
vice-president and Bradshaw as secretary-treasurer (Exhibit A; Tr. 15).
Beckstead became and still is the general manager of
the corporation ( Tr. 727, 1196).
Beckstead had no money and he put no money into the
corporation.

While he testified that each of the three

promoters put in a check for $150 ( Tr. 1651), yet there is
no evidence that these checks were ever cashed, and the
testimony is that the small expenses in connection with
the organization of the corporation were paid by Floyd
Bradshaw (Tr. 1227).
Thus, on the proverbial "shoestring", was started the
corporation which was advertised and represented as an
investment company (Tr. 1157) to loan money on first
mortgages on homes and property and to purchase real
estate contracts and to sell bonds ( Tr. 1039).
While in the original articles it is stated that the three
original incorporators had subscribed for stock in the
corporation, W. R. Beckstead and Floyd S. Bradshaw each
subscribing for 39 shares of Common Stock and 40 shares
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of Preferred
~h<lres

~tock,

<llHl ,,.... ~A. Green subscribing for ~0

of Comn1on Stot·k (lnd

~0 ~hare~

of Preferred Stock,

yet 31r. Beckstead testified that the organizers and promoters paid nothing for such

~tock,

but that same 'vas a

paper transaction, '"rhereby the stock was issued to the
organizers and promoters upon their signing a promissory
note, 'vhich note "·as never paid ( Tr. 148, 1663, 1664, 1715).
He testified that the above mentioned stock,
·',yas issued and placed in the treasury, and assigned
over to the corporation, with a promissory note, and
that 'vas held "Tith the note as collateral, and later
on that "\Yas canceled and the note was canceled.
"So, the turning in of the stock and the value of
it, canceled the obligation of the note" ( Tr. 1648,
1663, 1664).
Regarding the Common Stock which was issued to

'V. R. Beckstead, he testified:
"I don't believe I paid cash for any of it" ( Tr.
1649).
Again:
"I didn't pay any money for it. The stock that
the United Bond issued to me, I told you a minute
ago, I didn't pay any money for any of the stock"
( Tr. 1649).
It was testified that "in the neighborhood of about
300 shares" of Common voting Stock was issued by Floyd
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-12Bradsh'aw, but the books of the corporation do not indicate
that Mr. Bradshaw paid anything in money or property
for the issuance to him of such shares, and Mr. Beckstead,
president of the corporation, and Boyd Evans, secretarytreasurer and bookkeeper for the corporation, were unable
to inform or advise the court, when on the witness stand,
of any money or thing of value that had been given by
Mr. Bradsha"r to the corporation for the stock so issued
to him ( Tr. 1662, 1666, 1678, 1680, 1705).
The minutes of the corporation were searched but they
contain no minute entry and show no authorization, either
on the part of the directors or of the stockholders for the
issuance to either Beckstead or to Bradshaw of any stock
of the corporation, either Common or Preferred ( Tr. 1666,
1678).
The Stockholders Supplied All the Capital

Starting with nothing) all of the capital of the corporation was furnished and supplied by respondents and other
stockholders and investors who bought and paid for the
Preferred Stock of the corporation.
No part of the capital of the corporation, either in
money or property, was contributed or supplied by the

brother-in-lau' trio of promoters,-Beckstead, Green and
Bradshaw.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13'''"bile the corporation '"as organized under the laws
of rtah, it did not eon1ply 'Yith Utah ·s Seeurities Act, nor

did it eT"en apply for a license to sell its stock in Utah
(Tr. 1228).
To get the money on 'Yhich to do business Beckstead
and his associates

immediatel~T

launched a high-pressure

stock-selling campaign ( Tr. 1035, 1229).
Beckstead actiYely participated in the sales of the
stock of the corporation ( Tr. 1034, 1035, 1193, 1642).

In

addition numerous other salesmen were engaged ( Tr.
1238).
The stock of the corporation was first sold in the
State of Ne-vada, where the selling commenced in September, 1927 ( Tr. 1228, 1229) .
:Kext, in the year 1928, the company qualified itself
to do business in the state of Montana, and thereupon
immediately commenced selling its stock in that state (Tr.
1034, 1229 ) .
The stock salesmen received no salaries but worked
on a strictly commission basis, paying their own expenses
( Tr. 1228, 1229).
Beckstead likewise, during the entire stock-selling
campaign, and until December, 1931, received no salary
whatever from the corporation ( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1643). He,
like the other salesmen, paid his own expenses ( Tr. 1193,
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-141194), accepting for his entire compensation the commissions which he received on the sales of the company's stock
and securities· ( Tr. 1035, 1193, 1194, 1643).
The stock was offered for sale in "units", a unit consisting of one share of Common Stock and one share of
Preferred Stock.
Originally the stock sold at $125 per unit, later at $135
per unit and finally at $150 per unit ( Tr. 907, 1238, 1647).
:1\ir. Beckstead received the same commission on the
securities which he sold as did the other salesmen, and in
addition thereto he received, what he terms, an "overwriting" commission on all the stock sold by the other salesmen, which "overwriting" commission amounted to about
$2.50 per unit ( Tr. 1194, 1195, 164 7).
The moneys received from the sale of units of stock in
excess of the par value of $100 per share of the Preferred
Stock was to be used for the payment of commissions to
salesmen, the "overwriting" commission to the manager,
W. R. Beckstead, and for advertising and office expenses.
Thus, upon the sale of a unit of stock for $125 the sum of
$25 would be used for the payment of commissions, expenses and charges last above mentioned, and the balance,
in the amount of $100, it was represented, would be retained by the corporation intact and would go to make up
the capital of the corporation to be used for investment
purposes ( Tr. 1660, 1661, 1730-1733).
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-15Classes of Corporate Stock

In the beginning the corporation had only two classes
of stock.

I?irst, there \Yere 300 shares of Common Class A Stock,
·which "Tas the roting stock, but "Thich had no par vpJne.
Second, there "Tere 500 shares of Preferred Stock,
which \Vas non-voting stock, having a par value of $100 per
share, and which \Yas to receive dividends of 7lf0 per annum (Exhibit . :-\_; Tr. 15, 728, 1238).
The Preferred Stock certificates contained a provision
therein reading :
"Such Stock shall be redeemable, in whole or in
part, at the option of the Corporation, at any time
or times at one hundred and five (105lf0 ) per cent
of the par value thereof plus accrued dividends, if
retired within five years after the i~suance of such
share or shares, or at the par value thereof plus
accrued and unpaid dividends if retired after the
expiration of said five years, upon such notice and
in such manner as may be prescribed by the Board
of this Corporation."
Later, by a series of amendments to the articles, additional classes of stock were provided for from time to
tiine and the amount of the capital stock was increased.
After the last of such amendments the capital stock
structure \vas as follo\vs ( Tr. 15, Exhibit A) :
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-161,000 shares Common Class A Stock (voting stock)
no par value
10,000 shares Common Class AA Stock (Double A
non-voting stock) no par value
7,500 shares Preferred Stock, par value $100 per
share
5,000 shares Common Class B Stock (non-voting
stock) no par value (Exhibit A; Tr. 15)
The holders of Common Class A Stock have the sole
and exclusive voting rights: in the corporation, and therefore the exclusive right to select the directors, officers and
agents of the corporation and to control its affairs and
establish its policy (Exhibit A; amendment to articles,
Tr. 15).
Early in its stock-selling campaign the corporation
discontinued issuing the Common Class A voting stock
( Tr. 1359) and on December 29, 1928, by an amendment
to its articles, provided for another class of common stock,
which is designated as Class B Common Stock, and provided therein,
"that the common stock class 'B' and the holding
or ownership thereof shall not carry with it any
right to vote at any meeting of the stockholders".
On January 27, 1931, by a fourth amendment to its
articles, the corporation provided for the creation and issuance of 10,000 shares of Common Class Double A Stock
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-17.. without

nonu~nal

or par ca luc '), \Yhich an1end1nent further

provided:
" (b) Said shares of Preferred stock, and said
shares of Common Class B Stock and said shares of
Common Class Double .A. stock, or any of them, shall
not haYe, and the holding or ownership thereof,
shall not carry "yith it an~y right to vote at any meeting of stockholders, either for the election of directors. amending the Articles of Incorporation in
any particulars, or for establishing priorities or
creating preferences among the several classes. of
stock or creating new issues of stock, for consolidation, for voluntary dissolution or for any other
rna tter, purpose or thing affecting the business and
affairs of the corporation, and no notice of any kind
of any meeting or meetings of stockholders of this
corporation shall or need be given to the holder or
holders of said shares of Preferred Stock, Common
Class B Stock and Common Class Double A Stock."
( Tr. 13, Exhibit A)
After the amendment to the articles of December 29,
1928, above referred to, no Common Stock having any
~otill g

power was issued to the investors purchasing stock

of the corporation.
From then on a "unit" of stock consisted of one share
of non-voting Preferred Stock and one share of non-voting
Common Stock, being either Class Double A (Class AA
C(numon Stock) or Class B Common Stock ( Tr. 1360,
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-181361). Thus, subsequent to the foregoing amendments, the
investors who purchased units of stock, consisting entirely
as they did of non-voting stock, at no time were accorded
any right to participate in any manner in the selection of
the officers or in the management of the affairs of the corporation.
Two reasons were given by Mr. Beckstead for the issuance of this stock which carried with it no voting privileges
whatever. :B.,irst, "it cost too much money to call a stockholders' meeting".

Second, "I was interested in control-

ling the business" ( Tr. 1360) .
Beckstead Has Absolute Control of Corporation

By the year 1933 ninety per cent ( 90% ) of all the
Common Class A voting Stock issued, stood on the books
of the corporation in the name of Mrs. Stella C. Beckstead,
she being the wife of the director-president-manager-

,V. R. Beckstead.
Out of a total of 572 shares of Common Class A stock
outstanding, l\Irs. Stella C. Beckstead holds 511 shares;
one share each is held by Beckstead, Spilsbury and Evans,
who constitute the board of directors, leaving only 58 other
shares of voting stock outstanding ( Tr. 1233, 1238, 1239 ) .
All of the stock now standing in the name of l\1 rs.
Stella Beckstead has been transferred from stock that
formerly stood in the name of her husband, 'Vesley I-t
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-19Beckstead ( Tr. 1658).

BPekstead has the custody of all

these certificates, san1e being kept by him in his safety
deposit box at the bank (Tr. 1654).
On the "?itness stand Beckstead was asked if these
~ertificates

of stock had not been endorsed in blank by his

wife ( Tr. 1654, 1655) and he replied :
(•J zroztldn)t say; I don't think they are, Mr.
...-\. dair" ( Tr. 1655) .

Demand was made upon Beckstead to produce the
certificates in court "to see whether they are endorsed or
not" ( Tr. 165-!), but the certificates 'vere never produced.
The reasons given for failure to produce the certificates were 1) that they "are in custodia legis)) having been
attached as

~lr.

Beckstead's property in a suit brought

against him by his former attorneys, Hurd & Rurd, for
legal services rendered, and 2) Beckstead; s key to his
safety deposit box may have been lost ( Tr. 1655, 1656).
Boyd Evans, secretary-treasurer-bookkeeper for the
corporation, paid nothing for his one share of Common
Class A voting Stock.
Leslie D. Spilsbury, although he has continuously
been on the board of directors since the creation of the
corporation ( Tr. 15), knows little, if anything, of the
affairs of the corporation and has acquiesced in all deals
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-20of the corporation that have been called to his attention
( Tr. 785-819).
Beckstead, the director-president of the corporation,
and Boyd Evans, the director-bookkeeper, constitute a
quorum of the present board of directors. Thus does Beckstead, with his two "dummy" directors, have absolute control of the corporation (Exhibit A; amendment to articles
reducing number of directors to three;· Tr. 15, 1654).
l\1r. Beckstead at no time ever purchased any Preferred Stock in the corporation and neither he nor his wife
own or hold any such Preferred Stock ( Tr. 1659).
Selling of Stock-"Come-on" Dividends

In the beginning, and during the entire stock-selling
campaign, which continued to the year 1931, rosy pictures
were painted for the investors and great encouragement
was given them to induce them to part with their savings
and invest same in the stock and securities of the corporation.
Much of the stock of the corporation was sold on installment contracts.

The stock thus sold would not be

issued until it was fully paid for and, of course, in the
meantilpe, the investor "rho was paying on such installment contracts, was not permitted to participate in any
"earnings" or "dividends" of the corporation ( Tr. 1230,
1231)

0
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-21During the years 1927 to 1931, the corporation wrote
numerous letters to its investors ". ho were purchasing
stock on installment contracts, encouraging and urging
them to speed up the time of the payment in full of their
contracts so as to entitle then1 to participate in the "dividends~'

of the corporation.

From the Yery beginning of the company, "dividends"
were declared and wide publicity was given of this fact
for the encouragement of the investors ""rho received letters, notices and advertising of the declaration of "dividends·· in the years 1928, 1929, 1930 and in July, 1931 ( Tr.
12-±0, 12-±2).

In the year 1931 the selling of stock ceased and since
July, 1931, no "dividends" have been declared or paid,
except a small "dividend" amounting to one-half of one
per cent, being fifty cents on a $100 share of Preferred
Stock, which "dividend" was declared in the year 1937
( Tr. 885, 886).

CHANGE OF CORPORATE NAME

On January 27, .1931, by amendment to its articles,
the word "STATES" was dropped from the name of the
corporation and the company's name 'vas changed to
United Bond and Finance Corporation (Tr. 15, 16).
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-22TRADING INVESTORS OUT OF THEIR STOCK

Next came an era of discouragement for the stockholders and investors of the corporation.
In the year 1931, and after the selling of stock had
ceased, the corporation, or its manager, 1\Ir. Beckstead,
commenced to trade the corporation's stockholders out of
their stock.
Numerous and divers methods, devices, agencies, instrumentalities, as well as corporations, were used by the
United Bond and Finance Corporation, and its manager,
Mr. Beckstead, to trade the corporation's stockholders and
investors out of their stock.
"Sucker" Lists

Experienced securities salesmen, traders and stock
"pickers" were contacted.
To these were furnished lists containing the names
and addresses of the various investors and stockholders of
the tJnited Bond and Finance Corporation.

With the

assistance of such listS' of stockholders, called "sucker"
lists, the stockholders were contacted and efforts were
made to "pick up" or trade them out of their stock ( Tr.
149, 150, 152, 189, 190, 531, 534, 545, 636-640, 681).
Various kinds of paper were used in making the trades,
including whiskey warehouse receipts, participating cer-
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-23tificates in oil companies, intPrests in oil lease royalties,
stock of

InYt:~stoi·s

Thrift Corporation and stock of Ameri-

can Keene Cement & Plaster Company (Tr. 149, 150, 151,
152,

18~, 18~),

190, 227, 228, 531, 534, 636-640, 681).

To the stockholders it "?as represented that their
~tocks

had suffered the usual depreciation because of the

depression and that the company was practically insolvent
( Tr. 221, 531, 332).
In the event the stockholders should decline to exchange their stock for this other worthless paper, then
the salesmen and stock "pickers'' were authorized to offer
them

~'ten

or fifteen dollars per unit for the stock" ( Tr.

533) for "yhich they had paid Mr. Beckstead and his cor-

poration from $125 to $150 per unit ( Tr. 533, 1092; see
also 1043, 1047, 1157, 1368).
The corporation also accepted its own stock in payment of rent due it ( Tr. 1074).
The corporation purchased its own bonds from in~estors

for sixty cents on the dollar ( Tr. 1059).

'Vhy should an investor holding bonds of a solvent
corporation accept sixty cents on the dollar in payment
of such bonds?
For stock having a total par value of $203,087.11,
Beckstead paid, including not only the cost of stock, but
commissions and brokerage as well, the sum of $83,158.54
( Tr. 1077; see also 10J 7-1050, 1055-1076).
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-24Pogliano Is Defrauded Out of His Stock

In the fall of 193l Art Madsen went to Livingston,
Montana, where, for a questionable "oil lease proposition"
he traded one Pogliano out of the latter's units of stock
in United Bond and IT'inance. 1\iadsen immediately passed
these units of stock on to Jack Oldroyd, a security broker
of Salt Lake ( Tr. 640), who, in turn, "sold" the stock to the
corporation after the investor, Pogliano, had advised the
corporation and Mr. Beckstead that he had been swindled

i:d

by Madsen, and that he did not want his stock transferred
( Tr. 640, 857-861, 875-884, 1063-1065, 1301).
Thus, it is plain that but for this litigation the defendant Beckstead, and the corporation which he dominates, would still be engaged in "picking up" the stock of
his unfortunate and helpless stockholders and investors
whose interests he is required by law, as well as by conscience, to protect.
H. 0. L. C. Loans on Corporation's Property

To obtain funds with which to buy up the corporation's own stock, Mr. Beckstead borrowed money on property of the United Bond and Finance from the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation ( Tr. 502-504).
The witness, Mr. Gull, testified ( Tr. 506, 507) :
"I asked Mr. Beckstead how much stock had
been retired by the use of money realized from, parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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)I

-23ticnlarly from these H. 0. L. 0. loans, and he said
that 'vas difficult to determine as to the par value
or market Yalue, because it 'yas bought at various
prices, but that, approximately, as I recall, fiftynine thousand plus, actual money, had been used
in the retirement of these certificates. As to how
many thousands of dollars worth of stock, I don't
know that it "~as even mentioned, other than as
stated"' (Tr. 503, 507).
The Little Pouch

The certificates of stock purchased were endorsed in
blank (Tr. 50-!) and

"~ithout

being turned back to the

treasury ( Tr. 909) and

"~ithout

being cancelled or reissued,

the certificates, still in their original form, were kept and
permitted to accumulate in "a little pouch" ( Tr. 910).
Thus, for a number of years, in "a little pouch", there
reposed Preferred Stock of the corporation of the par
value of $203,087.11 (Tr. 1077), to say nothing of the
Common Stock,-all of it endorsed in blank and requiring
only that the name of the transferee be written in to obtain
a reissuance thereof to the holder who should present same.
How simple to write in the name of a transferee of
the stock certificates?
Ho'Y convenient to have all the certificates together in
"a little pouch"?
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-26Mayme ''Tilson was traded out of her United Bond
and ]j.,inance Corporation stock in October, 1931 ( Tr. 213215), and eight ( 8) years later, in October, 1939, Pogliano
'vas traded out of his stock ( Tr. 857-861, 875-885).

The

stock "was just held" ( Tr. 838) in "a little pouch" and permitted to "accumulate" ( Tr. 910) until litigation arose,
\Vhen transfer certificate No. 872, dated January 10, 1940,
for five hundred thirty-one ( 531) shares of the "accumulated" stock was issued to United Bond and Finance Corporation (Tr. 857) and included therein, among many
others, was the certificate of Mayme Wilson and the certificate No. 162 of G. A. Pogliano (Tr. 857, 867-870).
Mr. Gull interviewed Mr. Beckstead regarding the
holding of the certificates of stock, so endorsed in blank,
and testified ( Tr. 504, 505) :
"I told him that I wasn't at all concerned over
the application of the money in the retiring of the
stock, if I were assured that the stock, when retired,
would be actually canceled by the company and inure to the benefit of the stockholders.
"Mr. Beckstead wanted to know why I intimated that that wasn't being done. I told him information had been received by my department from
interested stockholders that it was not being done,
and that the certificates were being endorsed in
blank, and were being held by the company without
cancellation.
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-27"He readily admitted it. He said the certificates 'Yere largely receiYed and held in blank * * .,.
'·I asked )lr. Beckstead to justify the reason for
holding those certificates 'Yithout cancellation, and
he said that upon ad"lice of his auditors, that the
moneys of the company could not be used for trafficking in the company's own stocks, and they were
being held to an appropriate time when the cancellations could be made legally and properly, and that
that 'vould be done; and at that time in our diS'cussion he admitted, and later gave us a financial statement to agree "ith it, of approximately fifty-nine
thousand dollars worth of stocks that w·ere so involved.·· ( Tr. 504, 505)

INVESTORS THRIFT CORPORATION

ln"lestors Thrift Corporation was incorporated under
the laws of Utah on September 22, 1931.

Its five incorpo-

rators and directors consisted of the president, the secretary-treasurer and two employeeS' of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, together with Raymond Hill, a
brother of the secretary-treasurer of United Bond and
Finance Corporation (Exhibit B; Tr. 18, 743-746, 1208).
Excepting only for one qualifying share each issued
to

~1iss

Christopherson, )liss Hall and Raymond Hill, all

of the Common Stock of Investors Thrift was subscribed
for and issued to Vf. R. Beckstead, director, president and
n1anager, and to James C. Hill, director and secretary-
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-28treasurer, of United Bond and Finance Corporation, Beckstead receiving 7,999 shares and James C. Hill 7,998 shares
(Exhibit B; Tr. 18, 746, 1210).
Property belonging to United Bond and Finance Corporation was taken and turned in "to pay" for these shares
of Investors Thrift stock so issued to Beckstead and Hill.
The property used for this purpose consisted of two contracts of purchase on the Premier and Norma Dean apartment houses in Salt Lake City, owned by United Bond
and Finance Corporation, which two contracts Beckstead
and Hill caused to be assigned and transferred to themselves individ1tally) whereupon they turned over and assigned such contracts to Investors Thrift Corporation for
the entire issue of its Common Stock as above set forth
( Tr. 764, 769, 770, 1209, 1210).
Although the trial court called for the production of
the above contracts same were never produced.

Appar-

ently the contracts are lost ( Tr. 1122).
'rhe stock of Investors Thrift Corporation had no
value and, of course, no dividends were ever paid thereon
( Tr. 759).
Notwithstanding, Mr. Beckstead and his associates
effectively used this worthless stock in Investors Thrift
Corporation to trade the investors holding stock in the
United Bond and Finance Corporation out of their stock
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-29( Tr. 33, 36, 79, S0-82, 90-92, B3, 158, 159, 77 4, 775, 1210,
1~33-126-!, 13GS~

1369, 1399-1403).

The offices of InYestors Thrift Corporation and of
l"'"nited Bond and Finance Corporation were in the same
room of the same building.
-

Both corporations had one

and the same telephone number (Exhibits Q and R; Tr.
89, 90, 780). The lettering of both corporations' appeared
on the doors of the office ( Tr. 157) .
In .A. ugust, 1931, James C. Hill terminated his employment with both the "L... nited Bond and Finance Corporation and ''ith InT"estors Thrift Corporation and was
succeeded by his cousin, -n"'"illiam L. Christensen ( Tr. 780,
781, 782).
""'"hen the Investors Thrift had served its purpose as
a trading medium for acquiring United Bond and Finance
Corporation stock numerous "stock pickers" were then
engaged and set out to "pick up" and trade the former
inYestors of the United Bond and Finance Corporation
out of the stock which they had acquired in Investors
Thrift Corporation.
\Vhiskey "\Yarehouse receipts and worthless stock in
American Keene Cement & Plaster Company were used
for the purpose of trading such investors out of their stock.
\Yhen this trading had about ceased, and about the year
1935 or 1936, James C. Hill turned back, 1mthout consid-
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-30erationj all his remaining stock in Investors Thrift Corpo-

ration ( Tr. 757).
James C. Hill was the original president of Investors
Thrift Corporation and at the same time he was director
and secretary-treasurer of United Bond and Finance Corporation.
On li.,ebruary 17, 1933, Leslie D. Spilsbury, then, and
now a director of United Bond and Finance Corporation,
became president of Investors Thrift Corporation and continued as such until Investors Thrift Corporation was, on
the petition of Mr. Spilsbury filed J\1ay 26, 1.938, (Exhibit
C) formally dissolved by court action ( Tr. 791, 794, 795).
The United Bond and Finance Corporation purchased
for $1500, the assets of the Investors Thrift Company upon
the latter's dissolution, and included in these assets were

33 shares of Preferred Stock of the United Bond ( Tr.
1217).
Upon the dissolution of the Investors Thrift Corporation Mr. Beckstead "told Mr. Spilsbury to take the books
with him" ( Tr. 1218-1220) .
After delivering the books and recordS' of the Investors
Thrift Corporation to Mr. Spilsbury they became lost ( Tr.

795,796,800,801,804,805,806,947-950,954,936,957,962).
Some of these books and records which Mr. Beckstead
and l\1r. Spilsbury testified had been "lost" "rere discovered
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-31by the plaintiff stoekholders and introduced in evidence at

the trial.

AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT & PLASTER COMPANY
JONES INVESTMENT COMPANY

American Keene Cement & Plaster Company was, on
:Xovember 8, 1933, incorporated under the laws of Utah
(Exhibit D; Tr. 21).
Grant L. Crandall, another brother-in-la1v of W. R.
Beckstead, ( Tr. 488, 581, 1266, 1267, 1272, 1468) and C. R.
Jones ".,.ere incorporators and on its board of directors
(Exhibit D; Tr. 21, 1266, 1267). C. R. Jones was president
and Grant L. Crandall 'Yas vice-president and S'ecretary of
American Keene Cement & Plaster Company.
On November 6 ,1934, both Crandall and Jones qualified and became directors of United Bond and Finance
Corporation (Exhibit A; Tr. 16, 1526).
C. R. Jones was also secretary of Jones Investment
Company '"hich had its offices in the same room of the
same building occupied by American Keene Cement &
Plaster Company; namely, Room 408 of the Beason Building, Salt Lake City ( Tr. 1517).
On October 1, 1934, the following four certificates of
stock in American Keene (Jement & Plaster Company were
issued, viz. ( Tr. 1;)17-1523) :
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-32Cert. No.
19
20
21
22

No. Shares

Stockholder
W. R. Beckstead
G. L. Crandall
G. L. Crandall
United Bond & Finance Corp.

5,000
26,000
2,500
6,800

Beckstead paid nothing for the 5,000 shares issued to
hi1n in his brother-in-law)s company ( Tr. 1265, 1517, 1518,
1519).
The brother-in-law) Grant L. Crandall, testified, he
"didn't remember" what, if anything, he paid for his 26,000
shares ( Tr. 1517, 1520).
For the 6,800 shares issued to United Bond and Finance Corporation no cash

w~as

involved) but there was an

exchange of stock in brother-in-law· Beckstead's United
Bond and Finance Corporation for the stock of brother-

in-law Crandall's American Keene Cement & Plaster Company

(Tr. 1523, 1533)

whereby Crandall and Jones,

each individually) received five ( 5) shares of Common
Class B Stock ( Tr. 1532) and one ( 1) share each of Common Class A voting s:tock, which latter stock enabled them
to qualify as directors in United Bond and Finance Corporation and each of them did qualify and become a director in said corporation ( Tr. 1268, 1521, 1523, 1327,
1528).
The stock in the American Keene Cement & Plaster
Company, so obtained by Beckstead for nothing "·as worth
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-33exaetly "That it cost him, to-\Yit, nothing) as Beckstead well
knew· ( Tr. 47, -!8, 82, 123, 124, -!83, -512, 513, 1575).
:X evertheless, the 5, 000 shares of stock so issued to

Beckstead, indicidually. and the 6,800 shares issued directly to United Bond and Finance Corporation, were used
to trade inYestors and stockholders of either United Bond
and Finance

l~orpora tion

or of Investors Thrift Corpora-

tion out of their stock and holdings ( Tr. 40-50, 54-59, 63,

72, 80-83, 89-91, 113-119, 123-125, 1099, 1272-1285, 1420,
1-121, 1507 - 1515, 1518, 1520 - 1526,

1572, 1588 - 1598,

1605-1607).
In many of these transactions the Jones Investment
Company proved most helpful in effecting stock transfers
and in consummating trades ( Tr. 487, 488, 489, 1517-1533).

ASHTON-JENKINS COMPANY and
ASHTON-JENKINS INSURANCE COMPANY
Involved "ith the United Bond transactions were two
corporations bearing most similar names, viz.; a) AshtonJenkins Company and b) Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Company ( Tr. 1335).
\Y"ith assets of United Bond, including a ranch near
Ogden ·ralued at $20,000.00 ( Tr. 1345),

~Ir.

Beckstead

traded for the con trolling stock of Eddie Jenkins in the
..:\shton-~Jenkins

Co1npany of Salt Lake City (Tr. 1335-
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-341337) and Beckstead becan1e president of Ashton-Jenkins
Co1npany, whereupon he moved the offices of United Bond
and Finance Corporation and those of Investors Thrift
Corporation to the rear of the offices of Ashton-Jenkins
Company ( Tr. 1338-1339).
An audit of the books of Ashton Jenkins Company
showed shortages and deficits which resulted in a receivership for that company ( Tr. 1338, 1339).
At the time of the above transaction there "\Vere also
issued to Ashton-Jenkins Company 312 shares of Preferred
Stock and 312 shares of Common Stock of Investors Thrift
Corporation, but Mr. Beckstead could not

r~member

what

the consideration was for the issuance of this stock ( Tr.
1351, 1352) .
In a separate transaction and with funds of the· United
Bond and Finance Corporation, l\1r.

Beckste~d
.,:..

paid $12,-

500.00 for the insurance company known as ·Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Company (Tr. 1341-1344).
This transaction resulted in a lawsuit by Beckstead
and Investors Thrift Corporation, plaintiffs, against Ashton-Jenkins: Insurance Company, et al. defendants, Case
No. 51249, wherein plaintiffs demanded judginent of $30,000.00 (Tr. 1341-1346).
The original agreement with As:hton-Jenkins Insurance Company has become lost ( Tr. 1343) but a copy of
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-35this agreement, attached as Exhibit A to the cornplaint in
rase :Xo. 312-!9 supra. sho,Ys that the agreement was with
'Yesley R. Beckstead, indicidually) and not 'Yith the United

Bond and Finance or lnYestors Thrift Corporation ( Tr.
1364-1366) .

.A.lso, there

"~as

an assignment of $20,084.99 in claims

made to )lr. Beckstead, personally and individually, as
part of the abo\e transaction ( Tr. 1367, 1368).

WYOMING RANCHES AN.D INVESTMENTS

. .\bout 1935 the United Bond and Finance Corporation
began selling,. trading and disposing of its property and
investments in the state of Montana, and in 1936 it withdrew completely from the state of Montana ( Tr. 10421047).

· About

t~s

same time l\fr. Beckstead began to purchase

ranches,. livestock and other property in Unita County,
Wyoming, using the property, assets and funds of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation to make such purchases ( Tr. 1159, 1160).
Purchase of the Marks Ranch

On May 9, 1935, Louis A.

~larks

and wife entered into

a "Titten agreemeent with United Bond and Finance Corporation to sell to that company their ranch, comprising
-~
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-36904 acres of land in Wyoming, together \vith 290 head of
cattle, a certain land lease, certain telephone company
stock, and certain farm machinery and personal property
( Tr. 129, 130).
Pursuant to this agreement the Marks ranch and
equipment was purchased with property and funds· of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation, but when the instruments transferring title were made out, in 1935, on
instructions from Mr. Beckstead, the deeds, bills of sale,
assignments of leases and assignments of livestock brands
were all made to W. R. Beckstead, individually ( Tr. 135,
138, 175, 1159-1163, 1165; See Exhibit A-1, B-1, C-1, Tr.
132).
Witness George W. Smith ( Tr. 135, 136, 175) testified:
"Pursuant to that contract between L. A.
1\f.arks and the United Bond and Finance Corporation, I prepared all deeds, bills of sale, assignment
of leases, to the United Bond and Finance Corporation, a corporation of the State of Utah. When
they were presented to Mr. Beckstead, before obtaining the signatures of Mr. and Mrs. Marks, he says,
'You have got this all wrong. There is no United
Bond and Finance Corporation about this. This is
W. R. Beckstead. I want you to draw this deed,
this bill of sale and these assignments to YV. R.
Beckstead. It is going to be W. R. Beckstead's
ranch, and it is nothing to do with the United Bond
and J1.,inance.' I says, 'Beck, you ought to know
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-37~·our

business; you ought to kno"" your stockholders. There has been plPnty of rumpusses going on
here since the depression "·i th the building and loan
companies. I nm only a broker, I will do as you
direct me, if it is all right "Tith lVlr. ~larks', and so
I rcdrelo these deeds in his individ1tal name) and
presented them to nlr. ~larks, and he signed them.
* * * (Tr. 135,136)

".A.s to the bill of sale of the brands, my information tells me the bill of sale to the brands is to
this "lery day in \V. R. Beckstead. The owner of the
brands, of the cattle and horse brands, stands in
the name of ,,. . esley R. Beckstead" ( Tr. 175).
The Carter Ranch

The Carter Ranch, located in the same county in
"Tyoming, and comprising approximately 358 acres of
land, was likewise purchased with the assets of the United
Bond and Finance Corporation but deed and title to the
ranch \vas taken in the name of W. R. Beckstead, indi-

vidually ( Tr. 1174, 1181, 1182).
~

The Webb Ranch

_.1

.r.

The YVebb Ranch, comprising about 320 acres of land
in

,~Vyoming,

and including also a leased school section,

"'as likewise purchased, together "Tith the livestock, machinery and equipment thereon, with assets of the United
Bond and

J1~inance

Corporation, and the contracts and
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bills of sale and leases 'vere taken in the name of W. R..
Beckstead, individually ( Tr. 1174).
The Perkins Ranch

The Perkins Ranch, comprising about 700 acres of
land in Wyoming, was likewise purchased with assets of
the United Bond and Finance Corporation.

THE UNRECORDED .DEED
When Beesley, Wood & Company, public accountants,
made an audit of the books of United Bond and Finance
Corporation they showed and carried as an asset a purported unrecorded warranty deed from W. R. Beckstead
and his wife to United Bond and Finance Corporation for
the Wyoming ranch property ( Tr. 1011).
In their next audit Beesley, Wood & Company no
longer carried the title to the vVyoming ranch property in
the name of United Bond and Finance Corporation but it
carried the title in the name of Beckstead Livestock Company, although there was and is no deed from United Bond
and Finance Corporation conveying title of the Wyoming
ranch property ( Tr. 813, 814, 1011, 1315).
Numerous stockholders of the United Bond and Finance Corporation called at the capitol upon Ezra Gull,
then director of the Utah Securities Commission, concern-
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'tl

Jl

-39ing the taking of title to the V{yoming ranch property in
the name of Beckstead indicidually -( Tr. 4 75, 4 76).
'Vhen intervie,Yed by 3Ir. Gull,
that the

\\~yorning

property

""~as

~lr.

Beckstead stated

owned and recorded in

the name of the lTnited Bond & Finance" (Tr. 474) but in

an intervie\r occurring some six weeks later Mr. Beckstead
stated to )lr. Gull that the title to the property had been
taken and recorded in Beckstead's "own personal name"
(Tr. 475).
)lr. Gull remonstrated with Mr. Beckstead and Mr.
Beckstead said that,
"he had properly deeded it to the United Bond &
Finance Company, and those deeds were in the files
of the corporation, and at the proper time would
be recorded" (Tr. 476, 477).
The promised recording has not yet come to pass.
At the trial demand was made upon Beckstead to produce in court the alleged or purported deed or deeds from
himself and wife to United Bond and Finance Corporation but same ""ere never produced.

Apparently th.ey be-

came lost ( Tr. 1315-1317).
One of the troubles with unrecorded deeds.
The Densley-Beckstead Sheep

''rith funds of the United Bond and Finance Corporation )Jr. Beckstead financed 1\ir. Densley for about $12,-
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-40000.00 on 2250 head of sheep in Wyoming.

l\1r. Beckstead

took a mortgage on the sheep for the amount of the loan,
running to himself, individually.

The sheep were ear

1narked with aluminum tags reading, "DENSL·EY &
BECKSTEAD, LONE TREE, WYOMING" (Tr. 192,
203, 204).
The agreement between Beckstead and Densley was
that these two would split the profits after paying back
the United Bond and Finance Corporation ( Tr. 203).

BECKSTEAD LIVESTOCK COMPANY

Beckstead Livestock Company was incorporated under
the laws of vVyoming on April 16, 1938 (Tr. 894) with
50,000 shares of capital stock of the par value of $1.00
each ( Tr. 823).
The three incorporators and directors were Wesley
R. Beckstead, Boyd M. Evans and Benjamin L. Rich (Tr.
823), Beckstead and Evans being directors and presidentmanager and secretary-treasurer, respectively, of the TJnited Bond and Finance Corporation and Benjamin L. R.ich
being an attorney at law.
l\1r. Beckstead testified that Beckstead Livestock Company was organized "to engage in the raising and sale of
livestock" and "as a

su~sidiary

of the United Bond &

Finance Corporation" ( Tr. 1205).
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Ho,veYer, )lr. Beck8tead, in \Yriting, directed that one
share of stoek eaeh be issupd to EYans and to Rich and
that the remaining -!!1,998 shares be issued to him, V\Tesley
R. Beckstead

~Exhibit Y-3~

Tr. S2J).

Boyd )1. Evans, on September 25, 1940 ( Tr. 785),
testified that immediately after the issuance of the stock
as directed that he, Beckstead and Rich assigned and transferred each and all of the shares to United Bond and Finance Corporation, thus leaving the latter corporation
"The one sole and only stockholder in the Beckstead
stock

Company~~

r~ive

( Tr. 822, 824, 825).

""''ith not a single person holding any stock in Beckstead Lil"estock Company it 'Yould be most difficult for it
to function.

Who would be qualified to act as a director,

call a meeting, etc.?
Attention of the trial court was directed to these facts
and later, on December 4, 1940 (Tr. 1555, 1621), Boyd M.
Evans testified that during the noon hour, at 12:45 P. M.
on September 27, 1940, being during the trial herein ( Tr.
1624) and two days after he had testified as above, there
was "a meeting of the Board of Directors" of United Bond
and I1,inance Corporation (Tr. 1621) at 'vhich "the directors 'vere all present"; namely, Boyd Evans, Wesley R.
Beckstead and Leslie D. Spilsbury, following "rhich meeting one share of stock of Beckstead Livestock Company
"·as issued to each of the three directors of United Bond
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-42and Finance Corporation, leaving the remaining 49,997
shares in the name of the United Bond and Finance Corporation ( Tr. 1621-1623).
The three qualifying shares have been endorsed in
blank and delivered back to United Bond and Finance

Corporation, and Beckstead continues to run the layout as·
if it were his own ( Tr. 1623).
The stock certificate book, Exhibit C-4, is somewhat
irregular and, while apparently only ten ( 10) certificates
have been issued, yet a number of these certificates and the
stubs, as well, are missing from the book ( Tr. 1625-1630 ;
see also 891-895, 897-900, 1205, 1206).
The certificates "have been lose) ( Tr. 1629; see also
891-895, 897-900, 1206).
This suit was commenced in the fore part of August,
1940, and up to that time the Beckstead Livestock Company had never had any separate checking or banking account where funds were deposited or where checks ·were
dra1vn for the payment of the ranching operations (Tr.
1630).
The operating costs and expenses 'Yere paid entirely
by checks drawn on United Bond and :F,inance Corporation
up to August 20, 1940, when the Livestock Company, for
the first time, opened up an account in Wyoming with the
l\1ountain View Bank ( Tr. 1630).
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-43Thus, for OYer 3 years, i.e.,. from l\lay, 1935, to August
20, 1940, there

"~as

a constant intermingling of transac-

tions, expenses, assets and moneys of the investment company \Yith those of the livestock company.
Audits were not made annually but an audit dated
April 10, 1940, sho\Ys an operating loss of $4 797.63 for
1939 for Beckstead Livestock Company ( Tr. 1019).
The audits of finited Bond and Finance Corporation
sho"'" an operating loss of $3260.72 for 1938, and also losses
for 1935 and 1939 ( Tr. 1029).

THE WILSONS-A TYPICAL CASE

The \Y"ilson case may be taken as a typical exanrple
to illustrate to this court the mechanics and tactics employed by \Vesley R. Beckstead in trading and defrauding
the stockholders of United Bond and Finance Corporation
out of their stock ( Tr. 205-241, 250-266, 338-355).
John L. '':ilson and his wife,

~layme

J. Wilson, reside

at Park City, Utah ( Tr. 205). Both "are just poor day
working people" ( Tr. 238), l\lr. ''Tilson being employed in
the mines ( Tr. 254, 255) .
Prior to the organization of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, \V esley R. Beckstead sold the stock
and investments of l\lutual Savings and Loan and about
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-441923 to 1925 he sold some of the Mutual Savings and Loan
stock to the Wilsons ( Tr. 225, 235, 252).
After the organization of the United States Bond and
Finance Corporation in 1927, Mr. Beckstead contacted the
VVilsons and traded them out of their holdings in the
Mutual Savings and Loan, which holdings the Wilsons
transferred to the United States Bond and Finance Corporation, subscribing for ten (10) units of stock in the
latter corporation, Mr. Beckstead allowing the vVilsons a
credit of $457 on the ten units in consideration of the
transfer ( Tr. 212).
In addition to the above the Wilsons, through l\ir.
Beckstead, subscribed for five more units of stock ( Tr.
206).
The Wilsons paid $125.00 per unit for the first stock
subscription and $135.00 per unit for the second (Tr. 206).
The stock 'vas sold on the installment plan and the Wilsons paid $15.00 per month thereon (Tr. 207) until the
entire fifteen ( 15) units of stock were fully paid for ( Tr.
226, 227).
The total sum actually paid by the Wilsons for these
units was $1975.00 ( Tr. 234).
The Trade for Investors Thrift Stock

On October 3, 1931, a Mr. Paradis called at the Wilson
home and traded the Wilsons out of their block of five ( :l)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-45-

units in
them~

l~nited

Bond and l ,inance Corporation, giving
1

in ex . .lhange therefor, 8eYen ( 7) units of stock of

In Yes tors Thrift Corporation ( Tr. 213-215, 220, 227).
In making the trade )lr. Paradis represented to the
'Yilsons that Investors Thrift Corporation,
"was O\Yned by the same company, and they would
allow us a little extra on making a trade" ( Tr. 227).
)lr. Paradis,
"said )lr. Beckstead had this, and it was a little
better than the other stock; it was owned by the
same company, and would pay a little better dividends, and allow a little more on the United Bond
stock that was transferred, turned in for it, or transferred" ( Tr. 214).
The Wilsons Had Confidence in Beckstead

The Wilsons had confidence in Beckstead,
"because we figured that Mr. Beckstead was a business man, and that his business was on the up and
up, and on the square, and that he was going to do
just what \vas right by his stockholders" ( Tr. 236).
Mrs.

~Tilson

testified :

"'-ve are needing the money, and we are hoping
we can get some now to help us educate our children,
as \Ye ""ere promised it would be" ( Tr. 232).
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-46Again:
"Well, I always considered Mr. Beckstead as a
gentleman, and I figure that he has had our interest
at heart, and meant to do the right thing, and meant
to help people that were trying to get ahead, and to
give their children the proper education which they
should have" ( Tr. 235).
The Trade for Whiskey Warehouse Receipts

(Nov. 8) 1935)
In November, 1935, Mr. Beckstead engaged 0. P.
Pearce to contact the Wilsons and other stockholders in
an endeavor to effect a "conversion" of their stock by trading or exchanging same for whiskey warehouse receipts
(Tr. 24).
To this end, Beckstead, on November 8, 1931 (Tr. 262),
drove Pearce from Salt Lake City to Park City in Beckstead's automobile ( Tr. 251) and "on the way up" Beckstead told Pearce he had sold the 'V1lsons their original
Mutual Building and Loan stock; that they had made a
"conversion" of a part of their United Bond stock for Investors Thrift; that the Wilsons had been slightly discontented and that he (Beckstead) was rather desirous of
getting their stock ( Tr. 251, 252) .
Beckstead also gave Pearce to understand that the
United Bond and Finance and the Investors Thrift "were
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in a bad
(Tr.

condition'~

and that they

~'were

practically closed''

~33) .

..A.rriving at Park

l~ity,

Beckstead pointed out to

Pearce the ,,.. ilson home ( Tr. 253) and then went "down
town .. to " .. ait for Pearce

"~ho

""'ent to the Wilson home

alone ( Tr. 256).
Pearce testified:
"\Yhy, I told l\lr. and Mrs. Wilson that I came
up in behalf of the United Bond, and that-I explained to them the contents of the problem of
\\.,.hiskey Warehouse Receipts, and how much better
it would be for them, the exchange, than to have
something that w'asn't paying them any dividends
at that time, and I transferred their account to
\\"'"hiskey
arehouse Receipts" ( Tr. 255).

''r

On the above representations the Wilsons endorsed
and turned over to Pearce a part of their stock and executed and delivered to him an assignment for the rest of it
(both Cnited Bond and Investors Thrift) in exchange for
a receipt left them by Pearce calling for the delivery to
them at a future date of certain Liquor Warehouse Receipts ( Tr. 255, 256) .
Ji.,or making this trade and exchange Beckstead paid
Pearce $50 by delivering to him United Bond and Finance
Company's check in that amount (Tr. 262, 263).
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-48Beckstead ""vas elated" with this trade (Tr. 257).
However, after he had obtained possession of the 'Vilson
stock, properly endorsed, Beckwith desired to be relieved
of his obligation to deliver to the Wilsons the Whiskey
Warehouse Receipts to which they were entitled, for the
reason that it "would be an expenditure of money and
would cost him money" to obtain such Whiskey Warehouse Receipts and Beckstead did not favor "an output
there of the cash" ( Tr. 259, 260).
Thereupon, and only three days after the above trade,
Beckstead sent Pearce back to Park City to induce the
Wilsons to accept stock of American Keene Cement and
Plaster Company in lieu of the Whiskey Warehouse Receipts, giving as his reason that the American Keene stock
was already his property and it would not involve the expenditure of money ( Tr. 259).
The Trade for American Keene Stock

(Nov. 11) 1935)
Pearce, in a Plymouth coupe of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation supplied by Mr. Beckstead, returned
to Park City and, on Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1935), he
traded the 'Vilsons 1700 shares of Beckstead's American
Keene Cement and Plaster Company stock for the receipt,
certificate or contract calling for Whiskey Warehouse Receipts which Pearce had left with the Wilsons but three
days previous ( Tr. 260-262, 219, 220).
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Pearce falsely represented to the ''rilsons that the
.A.merican Keene stock \Yas worth a dollar a share and that
the 1700 shares \Yere Yalued at $1700.00 (Tr. 219, 220).
)Irs. ,,. . ilson testified:
"". .e traded on that basis at that time. He said
it "~as a much better deal, and we wouldn't lose all
we had turned in; "~e would get about seventeen
hundred dollars of "~hat we had invested" ( Tr. 220).

NUMEROUS SUITS PENDING

Because of this s"Tindle the Wilsons have brought suit
for recission against the United Bond and Finance Corporation ( Tr. 229).
The record shows numerous other suits by stockholders and others against the corporation.
SWINDLE OF STOCKHOLDERS

Similar sordid stockholders' stories of swindle were
related by the witnesses Henry Hoffman ( Tr. 23-7 4),
Frank H. Johnson (Tr. 75), Pearle L. Jackson, (Tr. 84),
Ida R. Thurman ( Tr. 100), Ray Hoffman ( Tr. 106; and
Dr. Frank H. Petty (Tr. 1556).
Attorney Black, in his cross examination of plaintiffs'
witness Henry Hoffman quite clearly brought out the fact
that the stockholders were beat every time they traded
(Tr. 66).
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-50STOCKHOLDERS ARE WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW

Numerous stockholders and their representatives have,
in the past, endeavored to put a stop to the above enumerated frauds and swindles by laying the facts before various
officials and agencies, local, state and federal.
Among the officials so consulted were the following:
1)

Ezra Gp1l, director of the Utah Securities Commission ( Tr. 4 72-520, 565)

2)

Dan B. Shields, the United States District Attorney ( Tr. 564)

3)

lVIr. Mansfield, the United States Postal Inspector ( Tr. 564, 565)
lVIr. Wallace and Mr. Roberts, of the county attorney's office ( Tr. 561-564, 559)
Numerous private attorneys including Horace J.
Knowlton ( Tr. 555, 556), and Mr. Skeen of Irvine,
Skeen & Thurman (Tr. 229-232).

4)
5)

The Utah Public Service Commission assigned the
witness Frank 0. Rich to investigate the United Bond and
Finance Corporation, its subsidiaries, officers and agents,
and to report to the Commission thereon ( Tr. 567).
Mr. Gull, as director of the Comn1ission, requested
l\ir. Beckstead to explain his activities in eonnection with
dealing in securities in Montana ( Tr. 510). l\1r. Gull testified that Mr. Beckstead came to Mr. Gull's office at the
Capitol,
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-51Hand he said he didn't think that ·1oas any of my
business. that he thought I had enough to do in Utah
\Yithout being concerned over Montana deals, and
I admitted it, and the conversation "rith respect to
)Iontana stockholders 'Yas dropped at that time"
(Tr. 510).
The other officials, like )lr. Gull, were unable to cope
"-ith the situation and, having no

adeq~tate

remedy at law,

plaintiffs 'vere forced to resort to this suit in equ i,ty to protect their inYestments and rights, as 'Yell as to protect the
investments and rights of all other stockholders of the
United Bond and Finance Corporation .
. .-tfter a long, tedious trial,-after extended argument
by counsel,-after considering the briefs of counsel and

the evidence introduced, the trial court granted plaintiffs'
petition and prayer for relief and ordered the appointment
of a receiver for the corporation.
Thus, of all the agencies appealed to by the stockholders, a court of equity was the first and only agency to
accord relief to the hapless and almost hopeless stockholders of this grossly mismanaged corporation.
No,Y, on this appeal, this court is asked to set aside
the decree and undo what a court of equity, in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion, has done in an endeavor to
('Urb the corrupt, fraudulent, systematic and habitual evil

practices so long indulged.
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-52-

ARGUMENT
1.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Assignments Nos. 1) 2) 3 and 4
Appellants apparently find nothing at all disturbing
in the evidence herein, a resume of which we have recited
above under the topic heading "The Facts".
Can it be that appellants have become calloused to the
deliberate, systematic and habitual evil practices of YVesley
R. Beckstead?
"So much a long communion tends
to make us what we are:"
THE PRISONER OF CHILLON)

Lord Byrom

And"Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."
ESSAY ON MAN by Alexander Pope
The evil practices shown by the evidence shocked the
conscience of the chancellor.
They will not be approved by nor tolerated in a court
of equity.
Thus does the evidence fully support, in all particulars, the decree and findingS' of the trial court (Assignments Nos. 1 and 2; App. Br. pp. 8, 9).
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-53The compelling and in1n1ediate need for the appointment of a receiYer

"~as

demonstrated and it would have

been error for the court to haYe done otherwise than deny
defendants· motion to dismiss made at the conclusion of
plaintiffs' case (.A.ssignrnents :No.3 (c) and No.4; App.
Br. pp. 9, 10).

2.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS

Assignn1ents Nos. 1 and 2

In subdi,ision lettered (a) of Assignment No. 1 and
in subdi 'isions lettered (b), (c) and (d) of Assignment
No. 2, appellants urge that the decree and findings of fact

are not supported by the pleadings of the plaintiffs herein
(.App. Br. pp. 8, 9).
That such contentions are wholly without merit will
be disclosed by an examination of the Complaint, Findings and Decree.
In Stevens v. South Ogden Land Building & Imp. Co.,
lJ litah 232, 47 Pac. 81, at p. 83, this court said:
"The ends of distributive justice manifested
by this complaint call for a liberal application of
the flexible rules of equity."
In Pitts v. New :\laininoth Gold Min. Co., 23 Utah
623, 63 Pac. 1076 at p. 1077, this court said:
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-54"The application for the appointment of a receiver is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, * -~ "'-. As a general rule, such appointment
will be made on application therefor in any case
w:here the interests of the parties appear to req~tire
it/) (Citing numerous cases; italics ours)
In Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 Pac. 1049, at
pp. 1051, 1052, the court said :
"A party cannot be sent out of court merely
because his facts do not entitle him to relief at law,
or merely because he is not entitled to relief in
equity, as the case may be. He can be sent out of
court only when, upon his facts, he is entitled to no
relief, either at law or in equity. Consequently,
an action does not now, as formerly, fail because a
plain tiff haS' made a mistake as to the form of his
remedy. If the case which he states entitles him
to any remedy, either legal or equitable, his complaint is not to be dismissed because he has prayed
for a judgment to which he is not entitle~. If the
facts stated are such as address themselves to the
equity side of the court, the appropriate relief will
be granted by the court sitting as a court of equity.
1 Cal. J ur., p. 312, par. 6.
"In the case at bar, the facts pleaded by the
plaintiffs clearly address themselves to the equity
side of the court. The prayer of the complaint is
for judgment for the specific sum alleged to have
been lost to the corporation through the misappropriation of l\iulford, 'and for such other and further
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-53relief n~ ntay be 1neet and appropriate.' The action
'vas one, therefore, properl~T cognizable in the equity
side of the court below."
In People's Bonded Trustee v. '':right, 72 Utah 587,
272 Pac . .200, at pp. 202, 203, this court said:

"Pleadings are necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. * * * This does not 1nean, however, that to sustain jurisdiction the pleadings m,ust
be free fronl defects or legal objections. If it can
be gathered fron1 the allegations. either directly or
,inferentially, that the party was seeking the relief
granted, or that he was entitled thereto, or if the
allega-tions tend to shotv, or colorably or inferentially shoto, each material fact necessary to constitute a cause of action, or if the object of the pleader
can be ascertained fro 1n the allegations, no matter
hotv defective they are or how rnany necessary ones
are 01nitted, the court having power to grant the
relief sought and having the parties before it, the
judg1nent is not void for lack of jurisdiction. * * *
"From the pleadings it is clearly inferable, if
not expressly stated, that the plaintiffs had an interest in the trust property, and by the remedy proposed sought to have it subjected to their claims.
l t is clear that the action against People's Bonded
Trustee zoas essentially to subject the trust property
to the clai~ns of the plaintiffs and other beneficiaries
of the trnst, and the appointment of the receiver
1ras a1t(··illary to that purpose. vVe think there were
ample facts made to appear by the pleadings to in-
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-56-

vest the court with jurisdiction to appoint the receiver, and having the general power to do so in
such cases, and, the parties being present, the appointment may not be challenged for lack of jurisdiction) merely because the pleadings are defective/)
(Italics ours)
In Riant Amusement Co. v. Bailey, 80 Colo. 65, 249
Pac .. 7, it was alleged that one Walker who controlled two
corporations had fraudulently diverted funds of one of
such corporations to promote and establish the other. The
trial court appointed a receiver and in sustaining its right
to do s:o, the Supreme Court of Colorado said:
"It appears, they say, that the arrears of taxes,
principal, and interest have been paid, and future
maturities will be met; that the property is yielding rent, all and more than it is worth; that the
decree forbids its diversion; and that a receiver not
only cannot make the matter any safer but might
not even be able to rent the property so well, and
would certainly add to the expense. These arguments are very strong and might convince us if "·e
"rere the trial court, but) to leave the matter in defendant)s hands would) under this record) be equiva.lent to rnaking vValker a receiver without bond, and
it is not unlikely that the court considered sucl1 n
course 1vouJd be indiscreet becattse hardly consistent
with its recent decree b.ased on a finding that 1l7alkcr
had wrongfully diverted funds. We cannot say,
therefore, that the district court abused its discretion." ( Italics ours)
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-57In Ellis v. Panther Oil & Gns Co., 171 Okl. 552, 43 P.
(2d) J23 at p. J2J, the court said:
~~The

'Ye11-settled rule in this state is that, when
a party applying for the appointment of a receiver,
pendente lite, has made a showing entitling him,
upon some recognized rule, to have a receiver appointed, it is n·ithin the sound judicial discretion of
tlze trial court as to zrlletlzer a receiver should br
appointed/, and this court 1rill refuse to interfere
1tnless it is clearly shon·n that there has been an
abnse of such discretion/) (Citing numerous cases)

"In the case of .A. nglo-American Royalties Corporation -v. Brentnall, 167 Okl. 305, 29 P. (2d) 120,
121, this court said: 'The trial court is clothed with
judicial discretion in the appointment of a receiver.
He should further consider, and himself review, the
matter on a motion to vacate his former order appointing a receiver. This the trial court did and
denied the motion to vacate. On appeal the burden
is on the defendant to show the error in the action
of the trial court. The defendant presents his attack upon three grounds, but they are not sustained.
In this case the trial court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, the allegations and proof were
sufficient to justify and sustain the appointment of
a receiver, and the action of the trial court in denying the defendant's motion to vacate the appointment of receiver is affirmed'." (Italics ours)
In Bryan v. ''Teich, (C.C.A. 10) 74 F. (2d) 964, at p.
970, the court said:
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-58"A court of equity by virtue of its general
eqttitable jurisdiction at a suit of a stockholder on
the ground of fraud, mismanagement, waste and
dissipation of assets by the corporate officers, may
appoint a receiver for the corporation to collect, protect, and preserve its assets and to continue its business, and thereafter, when there has been a change
of corporate officers or it appears prudent so to do,
may restore its property and affairs to its duly constituted corporate authorities." (Italics ours)
See also to same effect :
Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485;
Horejs v. American Plumbing & Steam 8. Co., 161
Wash. 586, 297 Pac. 759, 761;
Supreme Sitting of the Order of Iron Hall v. Baker,
134 Ind. 293, 33 N. E. 1128, 1135;
In re I.Jewis, 52 Kan. 660, 35 P. 287, 288, 289;
Haywood v. Lincoln Lbr. Co., 64 Wis. 639, 26 N. W.
184, 186;
Ashton v. Penfield, 233 Mo. 391, 135 S. W. 938, 946;
State v. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281, 143 S. ,V. 417, 421;
Ponca l\Iill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. "'\V.
46, 4 7;
Culver Lbr. Co. v. Culvers, 81 Ark. 102, 99 S. vV.
391, 395;
Davis v. U. S. Elec. P. & L. Co., 77 Md. 35, 25 A.
982, 984;
Gibbs: v. Morgan, 9 Iowa 100, 72 Pac. 733, 737;
Aiken v. Colorado R. Irr. Co., (C. C. Cal.) 72 F. 591.
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-593.

CONDUCT OF TRIAL COURT

. .-lss-ig n1n cn t 1-·l o. 3
Hard pressed for a defense and having neither the
facts, the la"T nor the equities \Yith them, the appellants
have taken refuge in the "Tilderness of the most technical
and refined rules of pleading, practice and procedure.
So fearful "Tere defendants of facing the facts at the
t·rial, and so apprehensive \Yere they of the outcome, that
they filled the record with myriad technical objections,
many of ,v·hich were as broad as a scatter gun charge.
~fuch

of the time of the busy trial court was consumed

in listening to arguments of counsel and in ruling on such
wholesale objections to the admission of the testimony.
Throughout the trial the learned judge displayed
courtesy, patience and tolerance.
To expedite the disposition of the cause and to accommodate counsel and witnesses for both parties, and with
considerable personal inconvenience and hardship, the
court held numerous night sessions during the trial.
At the very outset of the case the defendants presented themselves at the hearing of this cause without having
filed any verified pleadings, and therefore, without having
l'aiNed any issue of fact.

·yvhen attention was called to

the faet that the burden of proof would not shift until the
filing of verified pleadings, the trial court considerately

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-60indulged defendants and ordered a recess in order to give
defendants an opportunity to prepare and file the required
pleadings (Tr. 2-10).
At the conclusion of the recess defendants served on
plaintiffs and filed a demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint, and
also their written return which served as the answer of
defendants, and thereupon the court proceeded to hear
the evidence ( Tr. 10-14).
Numerous like instances demonstrating the patience,
consideration and tolerance of the trial judge for defendants appear throughout the record.
Notwithstanding these facts, appellants, as Assignment No. 3, broadly make the harsh and extravagant

general charge that the trial court was prejudiced against
them and that they "were not given and afforded a fair
and impartial trial" ( App. Br. pp. 9, 203-235).
Appellants have devoted thirty-two pages of their
brief ( 203-235) in a futile attempt to relate a single specific
instance w"ith which to substantiate the above general
charge.
G. A. Paradis "Connected Up"

Appellants, at pp. 205, 206, urge that the judge "Tas
prejudiced is demonstrated by his refusal to strike out
fron1 the testimony of the witness

~Irs.

Wilson the state-
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-61~

ment~

and reprPsentntions n1a{le to her by G. A. Paradis

to induce her, and \Yhieh did induce her, to trade him her
l . nited Bond stoek for stock of Investors Thrift.

Defendants contend that there "'"as and is no connec-

tion bet1reen G ..A.. Paradis and defendants and for that
L

reason that the representation he made to Mrs. Wilson

~

were but hearsay as to them.
The ans·w·er to this "'"eak and idle argument is found
in the record which shows that in October, 1931, upon applications made to the Utah Securities Commis:sion, by
both

l~nited

Bond and Finance Corporation and Investors

Thrift Corporation, that two separate licenseS: were issued
by the Commission to G ..A... Paradis to represent such corporations (Tr. -!T0-471; Exhibits N-2 and 0-2).
To )Irs. n;ilson, at Park City (Tr. 212-217) and to
Henry Hoffman, at Randolp·h (Tr. 31-37), G. A. Paradis,
to induce them to trade their respective units of stock in
United Bond for stock of Investors Thrift, held himself
out as the representative of Beckstead and of Beckstead's
t\YO companies, and he exhibited to Henry Hoffman credentials issued to him by them to prove his authority ( Tr.
31-37, 212-217).

The testimony of the defendant Boyd Evans and the
stock record book of the United Bond and Finance Corporation show that the respective certificates of stock, out
of wl1ich G. 1\.

Paraf~is

traded

~Iayme

Wilson and Henry
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-62Hoffman, were delivered to United Bond, and that after
holding same in the "little pouch" for over eight years they
were finally, and on January 10, 1940, reissued to United
Bond in its big "jack pot" certificate, No. 872 ( Tr. 865867).
In connecting up G. A. Paradis with the defendants
and their systematic and habitual evil practices, William
L. Christensen, a former director, secretary-treasurer, and
bookkeeper of both United Bond (Tr. 16, Exhibit A) and
of Investors Thrift ( Tr. 18, Exhibit B), was called as a
witness on behalf of plaintiffs and examined ( Tr. 654, 678).
Christensen proved to be a hostile, reluctant and
evasive witness.

He would not identify or connect up G.

A. Paradis as a representative of either corporation, nor

would he assist in interpreting some of the records of Investors Thrift which had been lost by defendants and

found and produced in court by plain tiffs.
His entire examination and testimony was so highly
satisfactory to defendants that they did not risk even a
single, solitary question on him on cross-examination and
the finis to his testimony is written in the record as follows:
"Mr. Adair: You may inquire.
Mr. Roberts: No cross examination.
The Court: That is all, Mr. Christensen. ("Titness excused. ) " ( Tr. 678)
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-63'Vhy, then, should appellants devote three pages of
their brief ( ::!~2,

:!~3, ~~-!)

in quoting the eYasive answers

of the 'Yitness Christensen to questions put to him by the
trial court in an honest endeavor to ascertain the truth?
The trial judge had no better luck with Christensen
than had plaintiffs' counsel.
There is nothing here to show prejudice on the part
of the trial judge and it is certain that no harm or prejudice "Tas done to defendants' cause by any of the testimony of former officer

,,~illiam

Christensen, who properly

should have been named as a defendant in these proceedings "Then they "\Yere started.
Despite appellants' contentions to the contrary, we
submit that G. A. Paradis is shown by the record to have
been rather intimately "connected up".
C. R. Jones "Connected Up"

Appellants devote nine pages of their brief ( 210-218)
in reviewing the testimony of the witness Frank C. Rich.
Appellants urge that the trial judge demonstrated
prejudice against them in permitting Rich "to detail conversations bet,veen himself and others not in any way re-

Jnotely connected trith the corporation or any of these defcndant.s'' ( ...\pp.

Br. 215).

The first of these conversations mentioned and quoted
was with one C. R. Jones (App. Br. 215-217).
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-64Why should appellants urge that C. R. Jones is not

in any way remotely connected with the corporation or any
of these defendants?
What says the record about Mr. Jones?
C. R. Jones was a director of the United Bond and
Finance Corporation and, on November 6, 1934, he filed
in the clerk's office of Salt Lake County his oath of affirmation as such director (Exhibit A; Tr. 14, 16, 487, 488).
In 1936, in which year United Bond and Finance Corporation withdrew from the State of Montana, C. R. Jones
was then director of that corporation and his name appears
as such on the corporation's withdrawal papers filed in
the office of the Secretary of State of l\1ontana (See Exhibit
certified by Secretary of State of Montana).
C. R. Jones is an incorporator, director and the president of American Keene Cement and Plaster Company
(Exhibit D, Tr. 21, 1266, 1267).
C. R. Jones is secretary of Jones Investment Company

"r hose

office is the same office occupied by the American

Keene Company (Tr. 1517).
C. R. Jones and Grant I.J. Crandall traded with W. R.
Beckstead certificate No. 19 for 5000 shares and certificate
No. 22 for 6,800 shares (a total of 11,800 shares) of stock
in .American Keene for one share each of the voting stock
of United Bond, represented by certificates Nos. 134 and
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-;)-

135

~ Tr. 13~1. 15~3,

1328, 1533), and five shares each of

Common Class 11 stock ( Tr. 1332).
These 11,800 sha1·es of stock in
ment and Plaster

l~ornpany

1-~merican

Keene Ce-

'Yere next used to trade the

stockholders of both United Bond and Investors Thrift out
of their holdings ( Tr. 40-50, 54:-59, 63, 72, 80-83, 89-91,
113-119,
.\i

1518,

1~3-1~3.

1520-15~8,

1099, 1272-1285, 14:20, 1421, 1507-1515,
1572, 1588-1598, 1605-1607) .

lTpon complaints made to Utah Securities Commission
respecting the trading of American Keene for United Bond,
~lr.

Gull, of the Commission, interviewed C. R. Jones, who

said ( Tr. 4:88) :

"I appreciate the difficulties of this type of a
transaction, and I am a director of the company,
and also a personal friend of Mr. Beckstead's, and
have great confidence in him. Another of my directors is also Mr. Crandall, who is a brother-in-law
of Mr. Beckstead's, and we would like to talk to
Mr. Beckstead to see whether we can't straighten
this out, without your taking any action" ( Tr. 488).
)fr. Gull testified further ( Tr. 489 ) :
"Yes, I particularly asked Mr. Jones if he was
trying to float an issue of stock for the American
Keene Plaster & Cement. He said, 'I have been
getting an issue ready, but this is Beckstead)s doings. and is not a deal of the American Keene, and
I don't ""ant you to hold my com.pany responsible
for any of these deals' '' ( Tr. 489).
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-66Thus has C. R. Jones been rather intimately "connected up" despite appellants' brief.
No sound corporation and no intelligent, responsible
and trustworthy officers would countenance· the stock
juggling and trading which were indulged in by Beckstead's brother-in-law, Grant L. Crandall and by C. R.
Jones in connection with the systematic and habitual evil
practices of Beckstead.
The trial court appreciated the fact that these men
"\\rere not only in bad company but that they were in bad
business as well.
The trial judge sat as a court of equity.

It was to

ascertain the truth that the court sent to the clerk's office
for a court file containing prior litigation and it was this
same motive which prompted the court's interrogation
of the witness Grant L. Crandall, of which appellants
complain at pages 229 to 233 of their brief.
The court had a perfect right in this equity case to
make the inquiries which it made and defendants have
no cause for complaint here for the reason that their rights
were in nowise or manner prejudiced thereby.
This suit is to be decided upon the substantial eYidence which has been properly introduced herein.

It is

not to be determined by the technicalities urged by defendants, nor by the amount of evidence which defendants
'""ere able to exclude from the record.
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-67A. W. Madsen "Connected Up"
.A.t pages 218 to

2~2

of appellants' brief they assert

that the "itness .A.. ,,.... :\Iadsen

''"~as

never at any time

associated with any of the defendants in any capacity
whatsoever''.
In the first place the testimony of A. W. Madsen,
whether "yholly in or out of the record, did not and will
not influence the final outcome of this case in any particular.
)Iadsen and his testimony are entirely too unimportant to warrant devoting five pages of appellants' brief
thereto (App. Br. 218-222).
)Iadsen, so far as this appeal is concerned, is just
another "red herring" dragged across the trail.
A. W. )Iadsen is the stock "picker" who last appears
on the scene. It was

~ladsen

who, but a few brief months

before this suit was instituted, journeyed to Livingston,
)fontana, "yhere he "picked up" the Pogliano units of
United Bond stock, which stock

wa~

promptly acquired

by Beckstead and, on January 6, 1940, transferred and
reissued to TJnited Bond in its big "jack pot" certificate
No. 872.

Beckstead testified that he had on a few occasions
purchased Cnited Bond stock from A. W. Madsen (Tr.
1311-1312).
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-68Madsen admits having worked in Montana with one
Egbert Pandolfo, another stock "picker" ( Tr. 635).

In

that connection Madsen testified ( Tr. 635, 636) :
"Q.

A.
weeks.

And did you work for Pandolfo?
For a short period of time, about three

Q. And in that connection, did you have, or
were you furnished any list of investors in the United Bond and Finance Corporation?

A. I was furnished, by Mr. Pandolfo, a list of
various securities" ( Tr. 635, 636).
From the foregoing, and in view of Beckstead's purchase and reissue of the Pogliano stock, after being expressly directed by Pogliano not to transfer same, it would
be a legitimate inference that A. W. l\Iadsen, Jack Oldroyd and W. R. Beckstead were rather closely "connected
up" on a most questionable stock transaction ( Tr. 13111313).
Beckstead, concerning other purchases of United Bond
stock direct from A. W. Madsen, testified (Tr. 1312):
"Well, we bought two or three times direct
from him.
Q. And you don't know what he traded for
that stock, do you?

A.

I don't know anything about it.
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-691-\nd you do know no"'" that Pogliano isn't
satisfied "·ith his trade, don't you, "'"ith him?
Q.

A.

I atn not 1lfr. Pogliano)s guardian.

:X o. .A. nd you never did tell Mr. Pogliano,
and haven't to this day told l\ir. Pogliano that, after
you recei"led this letter from him, of October 16th,
that you turned right around and disregarded his
request not to issue the stock, but bought it yourself, direct. You haYe never told Mr. Pogliano that,
have you?
Q.

A.

I haven't seen Mr. Pogliano ..

No, and you haven't written him to that
effect, have you?
Q.

. ~.
.

I don't think so." ( Tr. 1312)

Cross Examination of 0. P. Pearce

The cross examination of the witness 0. P. Pearce
by defendants' counsel was most exhaustive.
The first question put to him was whether he had
been convicted of a felony and he replied in the affirmative.
On cross examination of Mr. Pearce defendants' counsel read into the record, almost in its entirety, a purported
deposition of )lr. Pearce alleged to have been theretofore,
and on January 17, 1939, taken (Tr. 332).
This purported deposition, over plaintiffs' objections,
was

read into the record on the promise defendants made

to the court to "connect up".
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-70In overruling one ,of the plaintiffs' objections to the
reading of this: alleged deposition, the court observed ( Tr.
337):

"Counsel assures me that it is material. If he
connects up I will let it remain in the record" (Tr.
337).

The statements set forth in tbe purported deposition
were at no time "connected up" nor did defendants at
any time lay the foundation for any impeachment of
Pearce, for the simple reason that the alleged deposition
was not at variance, on any material point, with the evidence which he gave while on the witness stand at the
trial of this case.
Page upon page of .this "rholly inadmissible document
were read into the record by defendants' counsel, and when
defendants had finished their cross examination of J\ir.
Pearce he was excused from the stand.
When plaintiffs' counsel thereafter concluded that
they had no further need for Mr. Pearce's attendance they
requested the court to excuse him.
It was not until then that appellants made any suggestion that they cared to interrogate the witness Pearce
any further.
If after plaintiffs had finished with this witness, and
defendants had completed their crosS' examination of him,
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-71defendants had complPted their cross examination of him,
defendants still desired the 'Yitness to remain in attendance, that "-as their privilege, in fact, they could have sub-

lit

poenaed him and he 'yould have been required to remain

1(

over in Salt Lake.

However, he would have so remained

over at the expense of the defendants "rho needed him and
not at the expense of the plaintiffs 'vho had finished with
him, and that is the effect of the court's ruling of which
the appellants complain at pages 206-208 of their brief.
. :\sa
.
matter of fact, the record shows that the witness
did remain over long after the above had occurred and that
on December ±, 1940, when the witness Dr. Frank H. Petty
"-as testifying that Pearce

stand,

"~here

"~as

again called to the witness

he testified on direct, on cross, on re-direct,

and that he was finally interrogated on re-cross examination by Mr. Black, and that such re-cross examination concluded as follows :
And you knew all of those things at the
time you talked to Mr. Petty?
"Q.

A.

That is right.

Mr. Black : That is all.
Mr. Adair: That is all. That is our case, your
Honor.
The Witness: Is that all?
l\fr. Adair: That is all.
The Court: Does the plaintiff rest?
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~72-

Mr. Adair : The plain tiff rests.
The Court : vVe will take the afternoon recess
at this time." ( Tr. 1613, 1614)
Why, in the face of such a record, should appellants
leave the inference with this. court that the trial court had
denied them "an opportunity to supply the required foundational testimony" ( App. Br. 208) ?
Defendants were furnished with every "opportunity
to supply the required foundational testimony" ( App. Br.
208).

II

Their difficulty was the absence of any facts or

testimony on which to base an impeachment.
Speaking of impeachments, may we not revie'v the
impeachment of Mr. Beckstead?
Impeachment of Beckstead

Under oath, at various times, Beckstead has· given
various testimony regarding the o\vnership, transfer and
disposal of the 11,800 shares of American Keene stock.
"We Sold Him" the Stock

On September 26, 1940, upon his direct examination
by his own counsel, Beckstead stated that he had sold the
American Keene stock to Mr. Pearce, testifying (Tr. 1087,
1088) :
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H,,. ell, u.,e sold him) I think it was 11,800 shares
of American Keene Plaster stock, for seventeen
hundred dollars.
~lr.

Adair: How many shares?

The -n""itness: 11,800.
)lr. Adair: 11,800.
.A.. (Continued:) And we sold him this stock
on open account'• ( Tr. 1087, 1088).

On September 30, 1940, "\Yhen interrogated on cross
examination by plaintiffs" counsel, Beckstead testified
(Tr. 1271) :
"""'"ell, that is the way it was handled. The
sixty-eight hundred shares, and the five thousand
shares was sold to Pearce for seventeen hundred.
dollars.
In other words, Pearce paid, or agreed to
pay, and an account was opened for him, seventeen
hundred dollars, for eleven thousand eight hundred
shares?
Q.

A.

Yes sir." (Tr. 1271)
"I Gave It Away"

On 1\larch 4, 1938, in a deposition taken before a notary public, l\lr. Beckstead testified that he gave the stock
au·ay ( Tr. 1275-1277, 1279, 1281, 1282) :
"Q.

Do you have a record of American Keene
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-74Plaster and Cement Company stock owned by you
at any time during 1935, or any time prior thereto?
A.

I don't know of any record.

Q.

Do you own any such stock?

A.

At one time I owned some stock.

Q.

When?

A.

In 1935, I think.

Q.

And what did you do with that stock?

A.

I gave it away.

Q.

You gave it away. T·o whom did you give it?

A.

I gave it to 0. P. Pearce.

You gave it to 0. P. Pearce, and you instructed him to go out and trade it for United Bond
and Finance Company stock?
Q.

A.

No sir.

Q~

Did you know he was_ trading it for United
Bond and Finance Company stock?
A.

Not particularly.

Q.

Was it ever transferred in his name?

A.

I don't know.

Didn't he report back to you that he was
making trades, at that time,. of American Keene
Plaster and Cement Company stock?
Q.

A.

I don't know as we ever discussed it.

Q. With United Bond and Finance· Company
stock, will you say you didn't discuss it with hin1?
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-75A.

I don)t know.

Q.

Did yon discuss that?

.A..

I don't know.

Q.

" 7111 you say you did not?

No. I say I don)t remember ever discussing
it with him.
.A..

Q.

" . . ill you say you never did?

.A..

I don)t kHozc.')

*

*

(Tr~

1275, 1276)

..

Just answer the question, you paid 0. P.
Pearce $5.00 a unit to go out and get this stock?
Q.

A.

I didn't send him out.

Q.

You paid him for bringing it in on that

basis?
A.

I didn't instruct him to bring it in.

You furnished American Keene Plaster
and Cement Company stock to- make the trade with,
you personally?
Q.

A.

I gave him some stock.') ( Tr. 1277)

*

* *

A. Well, my answer would be this : I gave
him the American Keene from my personal holdings) and what he was going to do with it, I don't
know." (Tr. 1279)

* * *
Q. Did you ever have any talk with him, or
conversation with him as to what he was to do with
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-76the American Keene Plaster and Cement Company
s:tock?
A. It didn't concern me, because I gave it to
him/} ( Tr. 1279)

*

* *

But you want us now to understand you
made Mr. Pearce a present o1 that stock} and he
went out and made trades, and brought it back,
and sold it to you?
Q.

A.

Yes." ( Tr. 1281)
*

*

*

Did you personally acquire any stock during that time in return for your American Keene
Plaster stock, through Mr. Pearce, or anybody else?
Q.

A.

No sir, I gave that stock away.

Q.

Gave what stock away?

A. The American Keene Plaster and Cement
Company stock that was is:sued in my name, I gave
that to Mr. Pearce/) (Tr. 1282)
Such testimony prompted the court to observe,
"Now, we have got three stories in the record with
respect to this stock. What is the court going to
believe" ( Tr. 1421)?
The observation of the chancellor was apt.
It was true.

It evidences no prejudice whatever.
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-77A Problem in Arithmetic

At pages

~06

and

~07

of their brief appellants com-

plain of the ruling "?hereby the trial court put an end to
an wrgunlentatirc cross c.ranlinntion ill arithn1etic of the

w"itness Pearce based on hypothetical figures furnished the
witness by

appellants~

counsel ( Tr. 406-409).

On 'Yhat possible theory are such arithmetic problems
proper cross examination or admissible?
It is asserted at page 206 of appellants' brief that
Pearce """orked on a commission basis of $5.00 per unit",
hence if 87 units "?ere sold, 1chich facts are not in evidence)
it would be but simple arithmetic to compute the total
commission at $435.
"Half Statement"-Piece-meal Reading of Deposition
.A.t page 210 of their brief appellants urge that the

trial court's "charge of reading a 'half statement' is positively unfair as surely appears from the record".
"The attitude of the trial Court" during counsel's
piecemeal reading of the purported deposition of Pearce
throughout his cross examination could have been much
more "clearly shown and indicated" had appellants supplemented their "half statement" of the record, by quoting
the three succeeding pages of the record commencing at
the very place and page where appellants' quotation ended
(Reporter's Tr. 392-394; official Tr. 621-623) viz.:
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"The Court:

Well-

~lr.

Black : Starting down to the bottom, the
last question, to fix the time.
The Court : I don)t know
time.

how~

that fixes any

Mr . Black: Well, your Honor, of courseThe Court: The only interest I have is-I don't
want to direct your cross examination.
Mr. Black : No.
The Court: If we are going to save any time
by not going into useless matters, where you are
endeavoring to impeach a witness, and reading
matters which would confirm his testimony, we
shouldn't pursue that course.
Mr. Black: I will assure the court I want to
save time; I am just as- busy as anybody.
Mr. Adair : I think Mr. Black is reading his
deposition here in the hope they may conflict with
his questions, that I don't think that is proper, and
it isn't proper impeachment.
The Court: True enough, the deposition isn't
admissible; conflicting statements might be admissible.
Mr. Adair: Nine out of ten of the answers
confirm the witness.
Mr. Black : There hasn't been any confirmation yet.
The Court: Go ahead, Mr. Black. I want you
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-79to use your Olen judgment, but I think that if we
can be economical "~ith our time, we are going to
get this thing over some day.
~lr.

Black: Your Honor, this witness, I suppose. is one of the important ones.
The Court: I am not in any way restricting you.
l\lr. Black: Thank you, your Honor.
Q.

Mr. Pearce, you tell the court wherein

there "~as any agreement, in that first conversation,
to pay you fiye dollars for this United Bond and
Finance Company, per unit.
)lr. Adair: -nTe object to that as calling for a
conclusion. He is asking him if there wasn't an
agreement.
~lr.

Black: This is cross examination, and I
have a right to call for conclusions.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
A.

In the first conversation at Beckstead's

dffi.ce?
Q.

Yes.

A.

There was nothing said like that.

Q.

There was nothing said there at that time?

A.

In the first meeting.

That was the time you discussed the Whiskey ,-varehouse Receipts, wasn't it?
Q.

A.

That is the first, yes.

Q.

And so, when you testified in your deposi-
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-80tion that, ''Vhat, if anything was said as to the
basis of your compensation?', and you answered:
'Five dollars per unit for United Bond and Finance
and two and a half for the Investors Thrift', you
didn't refer to that first conversation?
A. Not the first conversation, no. May I read
ahead of that? You are just jumping from page to
page) Mr. Black.
Q.

Certaintly, I can't read it all to you?

A. No, I don't wish to. It doesn)t say anything about any time or place here.
Let's see if it doesn't. Read that question
before there, and see what it says there.
Q.

A.

All right.

Q.

I read it to you in the first place.

A. Show me the time and place. I would like
to have you show it to the court. I fail to read it.

"Just state fully the conversation between
yourself and Mr. Beckstead as to the matter of
effecting these trades by which the United Bond and
Finance Company and the Investors Thrift Stock,
owned by individuals, would be taken up by you-"
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q. "Q. What you were to give for it, and
how you would do it?'

A. Yes, but that doesn)t say anything about
the tinte and place) Mr. Black/) (Tr. 392-394)
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-81Thus, counsel \Yns called ;-the \Yitness won ;-and
the matter dropped.
The piecemeal reading of the purported deposition
made it most difficult for the \Yitness as well as for the
court and counsel to follow, as is illustrated by the following excerpts from the record:
~lay

I see the proceedings) and the after
part of that) so I can qualify my statement. I don)t
knoze what pa.rt you are referring to.
".A..

I am referring to the questions and an-

Q.
swers.

.A... ""\V"'" ell, is this referring to any particular
part? I would Uke to read above and below.
Q. I want to know if he asked him tho8e
questions.

The Court: He may not be able to identify
those questions and answ,ers without knowing the
context of it appearing before and after. Do you
recall having had those questions asked to you,
and having given those answers?
A. Why, there was so many questions, your
Honor-

The Court: I say, do you recall those questions
asked and those answers being given.?

A.

No.

The Court: That is sufficient, then." ( Tr. 348,
349).

*

*

*
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Calling your attention to the deposition,
I will ask you to state whether or not at that time
the following questions 'Yere addressed to you by
your counsel, or by counsel, Mr. Skeen, and the
answers made by yourself?
"Q.

Mr. Adair: What page is that?
Mr. Black : There is no page here on it.
The Court: It follows.
Mr. Black: It is page 9, your Honor, back up
underneath here.
Mr. Daines: What page did you read from
before, Mr. Black?
Mr. Black: Well, I can't understand that, your
Honor. It is marked Page 8. Maybe this is 19.
These pages, if the court please, I can't quite read
them. You see, there is page 3, but this page over
here is further back.
(Further statements of respective counsel.)"
(Tr. 349)

* * *
"Were those questions addressed to you?
A. They presumably were addressed to me,
yes, sir.
Q.

Were those answers made by you?

A.

They were made by myself, but-

Mr. Black: Your Honor, I am content with the
answer.
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-83)Ir. 1-\dair: I think he is entitled to his explanation.
The Court: That may be so, but that is a matter of redirect examination." (Tr. 352)

*

*

*

HQ. Is that your testimony?
A. That is misleading testimony, Mr.-not
the 'vay)Ir. Adair: Just a moment.
~Ir.

Black: I don't care about that, or not.

Q.

Did you testify that way, or not?

~lr.

Adair: \Ve will ask questions here. I think
I should be permitted to ask him a few questions
here, to find whether that had ever been signed by
him. I think the law provides for a reading over by
the witness, and subscription by him, of the deposition.
The Court: It provides that he should sign and
subscribe the deposition.
nlr. Black: This is a different case entirely,
your Honor. It couldn't be published here. I am
just asking him if he didn't so testify at that time.
The Court: But even so, in order that it might
be used at all, that it would be competent for purposes of impeachment, if you are using it as a
depositionnlr. Black: I am not using it as a deposition.
I am bringing it for the purposes of impeachment.
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-84The Court : The court n~ust know w·hether you
are using it as a deposition.
Mr. Black: No, I am just using it here as impeachment.
The Court:
Mr. Adair, and
to ask on voir
questions to ask

*

*

That, perhaps, is the situation here,
the questions that you would like
dire would very likely be proper
on redirect." (Tr. 363, 364)

*

"Did you testify so?
A. You are twisting the forepart, when I first
started to work with Beck. After I started to workAll I am asking you is if that is a part of
your examination at that time?
Q.

A. Well, your Honor, I refuse to answer a
question like that, because it is involving one part
of theThe Court: Mr. Pearce, you can answer that
question, whether you so testified. If it is an ultimate interpretation counsel for plaintiff can
straighten it out. (Tr. 384-385)

*

* *

"Was that your testimony at that time?
A. Evidently it is, yes sir.
crepancies there/) ( Tr. 390)

There isn)t dis-
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-85Stockholders Seek Assistance of Public Officials

The ''"itness (}eorge ,Y. Smith testified that he first
prepared all deeds, bills of sale and assignments pertaining
to the sale of the )larks property in ,-Vyoming running
directly to and in the name of lTnited Bond and Finance
Corporation, but that at the direction of W. R. Beckstead
he redrew all the deeds and papers in the name of and
running to ,-Y. R. Beckstead, indicidually ( Tr. 135, 136).
On cross examination of the witness Smith concerning
the above transaction appellants put the following question
to him ( Tr. 167) :
"\Vhy didn't you go down and tell the County
. Attorney about it?" ( Tr. 167)
Evidently at that time counsel for appellants deemed
it proper to lay such facts before the County Attorney for
action.
By the time appellants prepared their brief for this
court, however, their attitude apparently had undergone
a decided change for they now, at pages 210 to 215 of their

brief, urge that to admit in evidence what the stockholders
and their agents told the County Attorney and other public
officials, and such action as was taken by them was and is
Yiolative of "all rules of materiality, competency and relevancy" ( App. Br. 211).
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-86The testimony so complained of by appellants is material for it shows that before starting this action the
stockholders had exhausted the usual and ordinary remedies provided by law without obtaining any relief whatever and it further establishes as a fact that they have no
adequate remedy at law and that by reason thereof they
may appeal to a court of equity for relief as they have done.

Court Assisted in Production of Lost Contract

When Beckstead testified that he was not able to
locate and therefore could not produce in court the original
written contract which he entered into with Lauren ,V.
Gibbs for the purchase of an insurance agency, the trial
judge assisted the defendant out of his difficulty by sending to the clerk of the court's office and obtaining a copy
of the contract from one of the court files.
Why should appellants resent the finding and production by the court of a correct copy of the document which
they lost and were unable to produce (App. Br. 236)?
Surely appellants would not "rilfully conceal this Inaterial evidence, nor would they desire a chancellor, sitting,
as he does, in a court of equity, having personal knowledge
of the existence of material evidence, to conceal its whereabouts from the parties litigant and from counsel.
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-87The Impounding of Assets

Plaintiffs in their complaint pray for

~injuncti-ve

relief

and expressly req nest the court to restrain the defendant
\Y. R. Beckstead from disposing of any assets of the cor-

poration.
In the midst of the hearing and taking testimony
herein, Beckstead, on Sunday, September 29, 1940, delivered and disposed of 1102 lambs for which he received a
draft for $4300.00, having theretofore, received as a cash
down payment on the sales an additional $1,000.00.
Plaintiffs, learning of this sale, applied to the court
for an order to restrain Beckstead from cashing or using
the $4300.00 and to preserve its status quo) pending determination of this cause on its merits (Tr. 1142-1152).
Evidence 'vas introduced to the effect that in addition
to the $4300.00 check, the Beckstead Livestock Company
then had cash on hands of about $2800.00; that the current
indebtedness consisted of $1600.00, representing wages for
one year back for one employee, $600.00 owing to the foreman,

~Ir.

Youngberg, and back salary due Beckstead.

The court inquired respecting the taxes on the Wyoming property and was informed that same would not become due until l\iay (Tr. 1152).
No testimony whatever was given before the trial
court of any delinquent taxes owing, and throughout the
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-88entire proceedings defendants have at all times, when in
court, represented that each of their corporations is on a
thoroughly sound financial basis and solvent.
Under these circumstances, how was the trial court
to know that the livestock company was broke; that its
taxes were delinquent and that were the check impounded
the livestock company would suffer loss for "charges for
penalty and interest on delinquent taxes", as is charged
by appellants at page 225 of their brief?
These confessions, indicating the weak financial condition of the two corporations, cause respondents to be
most apprehensive as to what an accounting of the affairs
of the two companies will reveal on the solvency question.
The trial court was not motivated by prejudice against
defendants in permitting plaintiffs to amend their complaint, nor in denying defendants' motion to dismiss at
the conclusion of plaintiffs' case (A pp. Br. 9, 204) .
The court's rulings on the admission of evidence herein
likewise were not motivated by prejudice, but they were
the result of the sound application of the rules of evidence.
Judge Schiller is to be complimented on his conduct
throughout this case and on the record which he has made
for this court to review.
At page 233 of their brief appellants complain of the
"great haste" in which the trial court tried this case. The
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-89record is quite to the contrary for the trial of this case
consumed a great deal of time and a vast amount of evidence ''as introduced.
This cause "?as fully and exhaustively covered in oral
arguments by counsel for all parties.

The trial court

patiently heard the arguments, giYing each side all of the
time that "?as either requested or required .
.A.mple time 'Yas gil"en for the preparation of briefs
and exhaustil"e briefs were filed by respective counsel.
In fact the trial court granted the parties s:o much
time and he so carefully considered the facts and the law
applicable thereto, that but four minutes remained of his
term of office when, on January 6, 1941, he signed and filed
the findings of fact, decree and order appointing the receiver herein ( .A.pp. Br. 7).

4.

REFUSAL TO VACATE ORDER APPOINTING
RECEIVER

Assignment No. 4
That this is a proper case for the appointment of a
receiver 'Yill be shown by the authorities and cases hereinafter cited under the portion of this brief designated by
the topic heading "The Law,'.
As is aptly said in Kennedy Drug Co. v. Keyes, 60
'Va~h.

337, 111 Pac. 175 at p. 177:
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-90"A statement of the facts disclosed by the evidence is sufficient to sustain the order appointing
the receiver."
See also:
Mangold v. Adrian Irrigation Company, 60
Wash. 286, Ill Pac. 173.
It was not, therefore, error for the trial court to refuse
to vacate its order appointing the receiver herein (Assignment No. 4, App. Br. 10, 235).

5.

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Assignment No. 5
No compelling grounds or reasons were shown to District Judge Evans that would warrant him in undoing all
the work and labors of Judge Schiller before whom the
case was heard, and the order of Judge Evans denying defendants' motion to a new trial is correct (Assignment
No. 5, A pp. Br. 10, 235).

(See decision of Judge Evans in

Appendix to this brief.)

THE LAW
Corporation May Not Buy Its Own Stock

1.

In Utah a corporation is prohibited by law from

buying its own stock.
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-91See:
Constitution of Utah, Art. XII, Sec. 5
Re,ised Statutes Utah (1933) 18-2-17
Revised Statutes Utah (1933) 18-2-18
ReYised Statutes Utah ( 1933) 33-1-5
Revised Statutes Utah (1933) 103-12-4
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P. (2d)
1, also 91 l"Ttah 149.
Sec. 5, .A. rt. XII, Constitution of Utah, provides:
"Corporations shall not issue stock, except to
bona fide subscribers thereof orr their assignee, nor
shall any corporation issue any bond, or other obligation, for the payment of money, except for money
or property received, or labor done. The stock of
corporations shall not be increased, except in pursuance of general law, nor shall any law authorize
the increase of stock without the consent of the person or persons holding the larger amount in va1ue
of the stock, or without due notice of the proposed
increase having previously been given in such manner as may be prescribed by law. All fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void/' ( Italics ours)
Sec. 18-2-17, R. S. Utah provides;:
"No corporation shall make or pay any dividend except from the surplus profits arising from
the business of the corporation and in the cases and
manner allowed by law; nor divide, withdraw, or
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-92in any manner except as provided by law pay to the
stockholders or any of them_, any part of the capital
of the corporation/) (Italics ours)
Sec. 18-2-18, R. S. Utah provides:
"No corporation shall receive or discount any
note or other evidence of debt with the intent to
enable any stockholder to withdraw any part of the
money paid in by him on his stock, except as provided by law."
Sec. 33-1-5, R. S. Utah provides:
"Every conveyance made without fair consideration, when the person making it is engaged, or is
about to engage, in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in his hands after the
conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors, and as to other persons
who become creditors during the continuance of
such business or transaction, without regard to his
actual intent.''
Sec. 103-12-4, R. S. Utah provides:
"Every director of any stock corporation who
concurs in any vote or act of the directors of such
corporation or any of them, by which it is intended
either:
( 1) To make any dividend except from the
surplus profits arising from the business of the corporation) and in the cases and manner allowed by
law; or,
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-93(2) To diYide, "·ithdraw or in any manner,
except as proYided by la,Y, pay to the stockholders,
or any of the1n, any part of the capital of the corporation; or,

(3) To discount or receive any note or other
e"lidence of debt in payment of any installment actually called in and required to be paid, or with the
intent to provide the means of making such payment; or,

To receire or discount any note or other
evidence of debt, 'Yith the intent to enable any stockholder to 'Yithdravf any part of the money paid in
by him on his stock ; or,
( J)

To receive from any other stock corporation in exchange for the shares) notes) bonds or other
evidences of debt of their own corrporation shares of
the capital stock of such other corporations) or notes,
bonds or other evidences of debt issued by such corporation ;-is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics
ours)
( 5)

In the carefully considered and well reasoned case of

Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, this court, speaking
through )lr. Justice Wolfe (pp. 137, 138, 146-148) said:
""re see no reason why the prohibition against
'paying' to a stockholder a part of the capital does
not include buying his stock. * * * Furthermore,
the payment of capital for a certificate of stock is
nothing more or less than a withdrawal. When a
person withdra,Ys, he surrenders his stock certifiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-94cate and pulls out his pro rata or other portion of
the property. 103-12-4, subd. 2, impliedly prohibits
a withdrawal of capital. To pay capital for a surrender of a stockholder's rights in the corporation
-w·orks a withdrawal of capital. * * * Certainly,
the ordinary connotation of payment of capital
would include payment for stock or a purchase of
the stock. * * *

It is difficult to see how a corporation could
btty its own stock without paying to the stockholder
a part of its assets. That is impliedly prohibited
by special language. There are many ways in ·which
corporations may buy personal property without
buying their own stock. Consequently, the implied
prohibition against the prurchase of its stock is
simply one exception to the general authority to
buy personal property. This sort of articulation
makes sense. * * *
"Moreover, we can see no reasonable way to
escape from the wording and intent of 103-12-4,
subd. 2. It was meant to prevent assets from being
used to liquidate the stock of the stockholders.
Future as well as present creditors should be able
to rely on the implied representation that the corporation holds assets as represented by its outstanding stock. * * * Moravetz on Private Corporations, Sec. 112, states:

. (( (A purchase by a corporation of shares of it.~
own stock in effect amounts to a withdrawal of the
shareholder whose shares are purchased, fro1n membership in the company) and a repayn1 ent of his
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-95-proportt~onate

share of the co1npaHy's assets. There
is no substitution of me1nbership under these circumstances, as in case of a purchase and transfer
of shares to a third person, but the members of the
company and the amount of its capital are actually
diminished. ''"'"batever a transaction of this character may be called in legal phraseology, it is clear
that it really involves an alteration of the company's
constitution, just as the 'Yithdrawal of a member
of a copartnership, "'"ith his proportionate share of
the joint funds, involves an alteration of the constitution of copartnership. The amount of the con~
}Ja ny's a-ssets and the 11umber of it8 shareholders
are dintinished_; erery continuing shareholder is injnred by the rednction of the fund contributed for
the coHnnon renture)· and the creditors who have
trusted the company upon the security of the capital
originally subscribed, or ",.ho are entitled to expect
that amount of security, are entitled to complain.
* * * The fact that such a transaction may not
necessarily be injurious to any person is not a sufficient reason for supporting it. It is contrary to
the fundamental agreement of the shareholders,
and is condemned by the plainest dictates of sound
policy. To allow the directors to exercise such a
potcer tcould be a fruitful source of unfairness, n~is
nzanaye1nents, and corruption. It is for these reasons that a shareholder cannot be allowed to 1vithdra1o fronl the corporation "'"ith his proportionate
amount of capital, either by a release and cancelation before the shares have been paid up, or by a
purrhase of the shares with the com,pany's funds.'
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*
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"Every state which has come to our attention
as having such a statute as 103-12-4, except Montana, has interpreted this section to prohibit a corporation from buying its own stock. * * *
"The statute specifically by implication prohibits payment of capital to a stockholder. * * *
The courts must not make exceptions and cannot
construe directly against the prohibition. * * *
"We believe that 103-12-4, subd. 2, was designated to prevent the purchas:e by a corporation of
its own stock even though at the time of the purchase it was not insolvent nor would be by such
purchases rendered insolvent, at least in cases where
it was not for the protection of the corporation or
for its legitimate corporate purposes. If there are
any exceptions to this statement they are not presented by this case and we need not consider them.
The purchase by the defendant company of its own
stock from Sidney Pace was null and void/) (Italics
ours)
In Pace v. Pace Bros., 91 Utah 149, 63 P. (2d) 590,
being on rehearing in the case above cited (91 Utah 132),
this court, at p. 151 said:
"Most property has a fairly wide margin for
difference of opinion in value. It would be quite
easy for a corporation to value its as.sets high and
thus create a surplus and pay it out for one man's
stock. When the creditors attempted to collect,
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-97they might haYP the onus of proving that many
piecPs of property \rere oyerYnl ned so as show' there
"~as no surplus. If the actual property represented
by paid-in capital should, on a boom market, rise
aboT"e that measured by the corporation's stock liabilit~~, under such interpretation 'surplus' might be
used to buy the corporation's stock. When the
market receded, the 'capital' would be depleted and
the treasur~~ would haT"e in its place a batch of stock
certificates. This "rould be rather hazardous for
creditors. 1l'e think it was the intention of the
Legislature to prohibit a corporation from paying
out to stockholders any of its assets emcept profits
·in the fornz of di·cidends) or under such special circumstances as indicated in the opinion to be .an exception. The word 'capital' is to be read as 'assets.'
1\~atura.lly a di'Cidend cannot be paid to one stockholder in consideration for the surrender of his
stock) hence plaintiff's argument that $8,536 of the
$60,000 was a dividend to Sidney D. Pace must fall."
(Italics ours)

MISMANAGEMENT

In Tardy's Smith on Receivers (1920 Ed.) Volume 1,
page 723, it is said :
"The circumstances most commonly relied
upon by minority stockholders as a basis for an
application for a receiver is mismanagament of the
corpora,te affairs. * * *
"'Vhen all has been said that may be said along
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-98this line it still remains a fact, according to nnnlerous decisions of many courts, that mismanagement
of corporate affairs by the majority may ju~tify a
demand on the part of a minority that an officer of
the court be placed in control. A majority of the
stockholders of a corporation_, no ntatter how large}
has no right to divert to themselves assets of the
company to the detriment of its creditors and stockholders. . . . Although the majority of the stock
of a company may vote and vote as self-interest dictates and un<J_er ordinary circumstances the relation
of trustee and cestui que trust does not exist and
the ordinary rules in respect to trusts are not to be
applied, yet such power is not unlimited.
"The law requires of the majority the utmost
good faith in the control and management of the
corporation as to the minority. It is the essence of
this trust that it shall be so managed as to prod·uce
for each stockholder the best possible return for his
investment.-'-' (Italics ours)
In Clark on The Law of Receivers, Volume 1, page 265,
Sec. 233 (c), it is said:
"Courts of equity do, independent of statute,
appoint receivers of corporations when a proper
suit is pending for final relief. Such courts do so
when gross mismanagement_, positive misconduct} or
other grounds show a breach of trust on the part of
the officers of the corporation." (Italics ours)
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In High on R.eeei Yers, ( J t h Ed.) Sec. 295 (b), page
356, 35 7, it is said :
""1Yhere, ho,vever, it appears that the officers
and a majority of the stockholders of a corporation
are grossly nz is1nanaging its affairs in their own
interests and are fraudulently and wrongfully misappropriating the corporate property for their indi"lidual profit. a proper case is presented for the appointment of a receiver at the instance of the minority stockholders." (Citing Ponca illill Company v.
Jlikesell, 55 :Xeb. 98, 75 N. \V. 46; Hampton v.
Buchanan, 51 \Vash. 155, 98 Pac. 374. Italics ours)
Again, High on Receivers, at p. 356 :
"And the relief may be granted where the bill
discloses a scheme upon the part of the majority of
the directors to tvreck the corporate property in the
interest of a wrongful combination of a majority of
the stockholders with a majority of the board of
directors." (Citing Oantwall v. Columbia Lead
Company) 198 Mo. 1, 95 S. W. 856; State v. District)
15 3lont. 324, 39 Pac. 316; Hall v. Nieukirk, 12
Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485. Italics ours)
In Fletcher on Corporations, Volume 16, page 163,
166, it is said :
"For instance, misconduct of corp~orate officers
or majority stockholders is a ground where evident
that they are trying to wreck the corporation for
their own benefit, or where they are trying to freeze
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-100out the ntinority, or "There the misntanagement is
evidenced by or accompanied with conversion, misappropriation or diversion of corporate funds by
such officers or stockholders provided the misappropriation or diversion is substantial." (Italics
ours.)
In Ponca Mill Company v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75
N. W. 46, at page 48, the court said:
"Matters of corporate policy must be determined by the corporation itself. On the other hand,
when it already appears that the dispute is not of
that character, but arises out of an attempt of the
officers or the majority stockholders to abuse their
power by misappropriating the corporate property,
by using the corporate means for their individ1tal
profit, or by so a·cting as to wilfu.lly and wrongfully
jeopardize the corporate business, then the courts
should not hesitate to afford relief. No one is more
helpless, unless aided by the arm of the law, than
the holder of a small portion of the stock of a corporation, when the large stockholders combine to
advance their private interests at the expense of
the corporation. Here the demurrer admits, for
the purpose of this proceeding, the grossest
breaches of trust and dishonesty on the part of the
officer, and that a single man_, one of the wrong
doers, holds sttch a proportion of the stock that
others are helpless, and cannot obtain relief through
other channels." (Italics ours.)
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B. E. Brister sn,vnlill Co., 103
is an exceptionally

"·t~ll-reasoned

~liss.

876,

case \Vhich

revie,vs the modern eases and announces the modern rule
applicable

"~here nl isn1a nage1ncnt

is relied upon as grounds

for a receivership. There the court, at pp. 1020-1022, said:
'·\~Te

kno"'" that in the past the courts have laid
do,vn as a general rule that a court of equity, in
the absence of statutory authority, is W'ithout jurisdiction at a suit of a stockholder to wind up the
affairs of a solvent going corporation, or to appoint
a receiver "'"i th that end in vie": ; and we understand
that this rule has been based upon the reason that
a corporation is the creature of the state and its life
depends upon the action of the state, or of the stockholders as a "'"hole. We find that in the progress
of time and in the development of the jurisprudence
of our land this rule has been somewhat changed,
and the pozcer of a court of equity has been enlarged
for the purpose of more fully protecting the interests of all those owning interests in corporations.
In truth, at the present time a large part of the
business of the world is being conducted through
corporations. It has been necessary to change materially the general rules originally applied by the
eonrts in construing the obligations and duties of
those engaged in b us,iness through corporatio~r;;.
The tendency of the tin1es is to treat corporations
as if th e.iJ 'loere trading co-partnerships) ~r:ith the
.~tockholders as nternbers of the concern.
It was
stated by Chancellor \Valworth that: 'Joint-stock
corporations are mere partnerships, except in form;
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-102the directors are the trustees or managing partners,
and the stockholders are the cestuis que trust, and
have a joint interest in all the property and effects
of the corporation.' In the case of Fougeray v.
Cord, 50 N. J. Eq. 185, 24 Atl. 499, Hinman, C. J.,
said : 'Joint-stock companies in modern times are
nothing but commercial partnerships which have
taken the form of corporations for the greater facility of transacting busines'S.'

art is certainly the duty of the officers and directors of a co1npany to conduct its affairs so as to
carry out the purposes of its organization to succeed
in the business enterprise in hand, to preserve its
property, and to recognize and protect the rights
and claims of all parties in interest. If they fail
in doing this)" it is then their d~tty to bring the affairs
of the company to a conclusion. The 1najority of
the directors and stockholders should see that this
is done. Now, if in the face of the failure of the
management to do its duty, and of the failure of
the purposes of organization, and of apparent loss
to the company and ultimate insolvency, the majority refuses to wind up the affairs of the company,
then should not the rights of the minority stockholders be protected by the law? And if so, is not
equity the proper court to extend such protection?
We fully understand that everything possible should
be done by the rninority to get a recognition of their
rights and preservation of their interests tDithin
the corporation)· but) when it has been shown that
this has been done) then it should not be said they
are without any means of relief) and that they are
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-103required ·in the adnlinistration of the latD) to stand
idly by a.nd see the property in which they arc interested u~asted and lost and the business enterprise
n~rccked.

'·It has been decided that: 'If it plainly appears that the object for 'Yhich the company was
formed is impossible, it becomes the duty of the
company·s agents to put an end to its operations
and "yind up its affairs; and, should they, though
supported by a majority of the stockholders, pursue
operations which must eventually be ruinous, orr
should the enterprise be abandoned as impossible
of reaii.:·ation. any shareholder would) upon plain
eq zl'itab le principles. be entitled to the assistance
of a court of equity) and decree should be rendered
compelling the directors to wind up the company's
business and distribute its assets among those entitled to them.' Ulmer v. Maine Real Estate Co.,
93 ){e. 32-!, 45 Atl. 40; Benedict v. Columbus Construction Co., 49 N. J. Eq~ 23, 23 Atl. 485. * * -x"It is settled in this state, where there is an
absence of a statute on the subject, that a cou.rt of
equity) at the instance of a creditor, has the j~tris
diction to appoint a receiver beoause of fraud,ulent
1nirnnanagement of the directors of a corporation.
Benjamin v. Staples, 93 ~fiss. 507, 4 7 South 425.
\f e see no sufficient reason why it should not also
be settled that a co~trt of equity in this state, when
it sll rtll apzJear that by gross mismanagement of the
a flairs and rnisapplication of the property or funds
of a corporation by the directors, or other officers
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in control) the rights of the stockholders) as well as
the creditors, are being put in jeopardy) or when it
shall be necessary to protect the interests of such
stockholders or creditors and preserve the assets
of the business injuriously affected by such mismanagement or of fraud in the management, rnay
appoint a receiver to take charge of the business of
the corporation) and in proper cases, under the
orders of the court and in the progress of the receivership, wind up such business. Therefore, in
the present case we decide that the chancery court
has the jurisdiction to appoint a receiver at the instance of the minority stockholders) to take charge
of the b1tsiness of the corporation) and if it is shown
to the court to be necessary, to wind up such business." (Italics ours.)
In Hechler v. Emery et al, 226 N. Y. S. 599, 131 Mis.
Rep. 393, the court said :
"vVhatever view may be taken as to the propriety, the reasonableness and the interpretation
of the contracts by which defendant, Emery, obtained a 10lf0 commission on all shares of Class B
non-voting stock of the corporation, which sales
approximate $2,000,000.00, that phase 1vhich relates
to Class A_ voting stork is of a highly questio1wble
character. Here we have a contract entered into
by the corporation when it was practically in its
embryo state, whereby Emery was granted the
power to sell its non-voting stock on co1nmission
and the sole right to purchase 5,000 shares: of its
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-103Yoting ~tock 'Yith n fiye year option to take up the
15,000 reinaining share8 of such stock at $10.00 a
share. This stork "·as to be purrhased out of the
commission to be earned by him. The 5)000 shares
hat·e th-us been acquired by hint 1citlz the result that
he i~ ·in a bsol·u te control of the corporation) ~vith
full power of disposition orer its assets and of this
he took unto h inz.self zr·ithout the invest1nent of any
nloney whaterer) except such as he recei.ved by
reason of lz is coH nections zcith the corporation. The
situati-on presented here is an e.rtreme case of abuse
·in corporati.on organi.~·ation) the subject of much
current co1nment by econo1nists) whereby a small
group of rating stockholders are generally given
control orer the destinies of a corporate entity) most
of whose stock is of non-voting character. A sweeping but just criticism of such an undemocratic
method of corporate organization is contained in
Professor Ripley's book, '~1ain Street and Wall
Street.' In the chapter significantly entitled 'A
Birthright for Pottage' at page 68, he thus arraigns
promoters in a recent organization, who assumed
sole control of a corporation by retaining all the
voting stock: 'The promoters have virtually paid
themselves a handsome profit for the assumption of
the entire directorial po"rer, having mortgaged the
property to the full amount of its cost through outstanding bonds and preferred stock, including both
assets and capitalized earning power and the amazing thing is that this final death blo'Y to the exercise
of yoting rights by the general public has brought
no voice of protest. Yet the plan bears every a p-
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pearance of a bald and outrageous theft of the last
tittle of responsibility for management of the actual
owners by those who were setting up these latest
financial erections. Isn't it the prettiest case ever
known of having a cake and eating it too?' Here
the circumstances disclose a rnore flagrant situation, because the entire voting control is centered
in the hands of one man. Unless his absolute and
unlimited power be restrained pending the determination of the action, it may well be, as it is
argued, that he will distribute the stock among dtttrnmies of his own choosing, w·hile actually remaining
in sole control.
"The motion for the appointment of a receiver
is therefore granted. Submit order." (ItalicS' ours·.)
In Kennedy Drug Co. et al v. Keyes, (Wash.) 1.11 Pac.
175 at pp. 176 and 177, the court said:

"From this statement it will be seen that the
appellant Keyes has obtained complete control of
the corporation, holding nearly two-thirds of its
capital stock for which he paid nothing. It is further shown that he caused a subservient board of
trustees to elect him president, to make him general
manager for a term of five years· without power of
revocation, at a salary of $2,500. He insists that
he paid value for his stock, but he fails to prod1tce
any satisfactory evidence of that claim.

*

*

*

*

*

"Other irregular acts have been shown, but we
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-107close the manipulation, attitude, and eonduct of
appellants. Keyes, as a pron1oter of the new corporation, has obtained for himself, 'vithout consideration, large profits in the form of stock held
by him 'Yhich he Yotes and which places him in
absolute control of the corporation. He has reaped
such profits by the use of property of respondent,
to its disadvantag·e and prejudice, and by the violation of his promise to sell, for the benefit of the
new corporation and its business, the identical stock
"Thich he now holds and claims to own. He did not
sell to the corporation, at a fair valuation, any property which he owned or to which he held title. On
the contrary, he used respondent's property not
only to procure the money and stock which respondent received, b nt also to obtain for himself a much
greater amount of stock to which he now asserts
oH·nership. He has thus secured for hirnself heavJJ
profits not disclosed to respondent_, which he was not
entitled to obtain tvithout its consent) and tvhich ht
no-w holds and uses to its prejudice.
"Appellants insist that respondent knowingly
consented and agreed to accept the stock consideration ""hich it has received from the appellant corporation, and that respondent did not contract for or
require any sale of the stock now held by Keyes.Xo better response can be made to this contention
than to quote the statement of the trial judge, who
said: 'When Kennedy (respondent's agent) turned
this property over to Keyes to go into this corporation, it is inconceivable that it was in the mind of
Kennedy, at least, at that time, that a corporation
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-108for $100,000 should be formed, and that he should
have 176 shares for his $17,600 worth of property,
and that Keyes would have 611 shares for no assets
whatever. Keyes now has the absolute control of
this corporation. While the capital stock is a thousand shares, he owns 611. There are 75 shares in the
treasury. There are 15 shares which have been retired according to their theory of it, which would
reduce it to 915 shares, or 925 s:hares, it makes no
difference. That being true, Keyes now owns 611
shares, or two-thirds, over two-thirds, of the voting
capital stock of that concern. The board of trustees
is absolutely under ·his domination. He can call a
meeting of the stockholders and discharge every
member of the board of trustees under the statute,
by two-thirds vote. Kennedy's property has now
come under the absolute domination of Keyes. He
has the power to bond this. property for $20,000, put
it out of existence, and deprive Kennedy of anything more than he might get pro rata on his stock
as it now stands. I do not believe that the la"r ever
in tended in dealing with corporations that one man
should get the control of another man's property in
the method in which this was obtained and retain
dominion over it.'

"In l\1angold v. Adrian Irrigation Company,
(recently decided by this court) 111 Pac. 173, we
held that promoters of a corporation who in a sense
are trustees: for, and owe an obligation of good fa it h
to, investing stockholders, and who then1selves haYe
no substantial investment in the enterprise, cannot
be permitted to obtain profits to themselves withSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-109out the knO\Yledgt:'l or con~Pnt of inYesting s.tockholdei·s 'vho haYe furnished thP only financial support or assets 'vhich the promoted corporation possesses. ~! statcn1ent of the facts disclosed by the CV'idence is sufficient to susta-in the order appoint~ing
the recei-rer. Respondents demanded an accounting~ and a surrender of the stock held by the appellant Keyes, both of '""hich were refused by Keyes
and the appellant corporation. R,espondents claim
that Keyes is "·ithout financial responsibility. The
endence fails to show that he has any property,
other than the stock in dispute in this action which
he no\Y claims. His management threatens the corporation '""ith insolvency. The trial court so found,
and the eT"idence is sufficient to support that finding. .A.ppellants contend that a receiver should not
be appointed for the corporation, because it is a
going concern and is solvent. Its solvency is denied.
But conceding it to be a going concern, evidence has
been introduced to show that the appellant Keyes
has obtained complete control by means of 611
shares of stock, which he has caused to be issued to
himself "'"ithout payment or consideration; and
that, being thus in control, he is so conducting the
business as to threaten insolvency. If there was
any substantial evidence that he had paid value for
and o"·ned the stock no"T held by him, in what he
claims is a going and solvent corporation, a different
question would be presented; but no such showing
has been made.'' (Italics ours.)
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-110In Cant'\Yell et al v. Colu1nbia Lead Co., 97 S. VV. 167
at p. 179, the Supreme Court of l\1issouri said:
"Courts have hesitated to lift the affairs and
assets out of the hands of its board of directors and
administer them through receivers, and have flatly
said so, and given cogent reasons for this hesitancy:"
(Citing cases.) "But when all this has been said,
it may further be said that this court has. never
denied power in a chancellor to prevent a scheme of
irreparable injury and wrong merely because the
movers in that scheme speak and act in a corporate
capacity rather than in an individual capacity.
That solvent corporations are wrecked for purely
selfish and illegal purposes, that minority interests
are (frozen out/ that business immorality has run
amuck under the assumption that courts are powerless, is too true. But the assumption is tDrong.
Judicial hesitancy does not mean judicial atrophy
or paralysis. The board of dit·ectors of a corporation are but trustees of an estate for all the stockholders, and may not only be amenable to the law,
personally, for a breach of trust, but their corporate
power under color of office to effectua·te a conte1n. plated wrong may be taken from them when, by
fraud, conspiracy, or covinous condttct, or emtrerne
misn~anagement, the rights of minority stockholders
are put in imminent peril, and the underlying) ori,q. inal, corporate entente cordiale is 'ltnfairly destroyed. It would be a sad commentary on the law
· if, when the trustee of a corporate estate is nuliking
. an improper disposition of it, or has shown i1npr·oper
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-111· pa·rtiality to1ca rds one of its coHfrict·ing part·ics)
or has put the estate in a fi.r ·it Is liable and likely
to be either 'u~astcd or destroyed., or 1nercilessly taken
fronl. all and giren to a part, a court could not reach
out its ar1n, and preserPe and adnlinister the estate.
-n:e haYe never so declared the la,v. Greely v. Bank,
103 Jlo. ~12, 15 S.
-!29; Rev. St. 1699, Sec. 753;
Id. Sec. 1338, 1339; Gluck & Becker on Receivers
of Corporations, Sec. 9, p. 53; Smith on Receiverships, Sec. ~~3; .AJlison on Receivers, Sec. 346-357;
and see, generally, the cases cited in State ex rei.
. Attorney General Y. People,s United States Bank,
supra.

''r·

'"The bill in this case stateS' a cause of action,
and the court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver,
in our opinion. Therefore, the judgment and order
nisi, refusing to revoke the appointment of one is,
accordingly, affirmed. All concur." (Citing numerous authorities; italics ours.)
In )lorse v. Metropolitan S. S. Co. et al, 87 N. J. E.q.
219, 100 Atl. 219 at p. 221, the court said :
"I do not find all the circumstances under
which the court may intervene have ever been definitely determined. In the nature of things they
could not be. I do not find that the courts of this
state have in any wise limited the ·general doctrine
which prevails in England and throughout this
country that, tchererer because of gross abuse .of
trust, because of dissensions among the members of
the board of directors or the stockholders, because

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

--112there is no properly constituted board, or because
the company has failed of its purpose, there is a
necessity for judicial intervention, a court of equity
rnay intervene under its general jtttrisdiction and
appoint a receiver and grant such other relief as
may be necessary. The text-book authorities are to
the effect that the power exists, but, of course, must
be exercised with discretion. Thompson on Corporations, vol. 5, sec. 6826; Beach on Receivers, Sec.
424; Machen on Corporations, vol. 2, Sec. 1161;
Clark & Marshall on Corporations, sec. 556; High
on Receivers (4th ed.) sec. 288." (Italics ours.)
Again in the Morse case, supra, at p. 222:
"If this company was an operating concern,
whose business might be hurt by the appointment
of a receiver, there would be, of course, a further
argument against any hasty action by this court.
It is not. Its only function at the present time is
to receive the rents from the Harvard and Yale,
which are under a five-year lease on the Pacific
Coast, and pay such debts as may incidentally accrue. There is no discretion to be exercised. The
directors have effectively foreclosed themselves from
exercising any discretion. vVha tever the directors
of this company might do can as well be done by a
receiver.''
In Sant v. Perronville Shingle Co., 179 Mich. 42, 146
N. W. 212 at pp. 217, 218;the court said:
"That a minority stockholder may file a bill
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-113to force an accounting nnd 'Yind up the affairs of
the corporation '""here the officers in control refuse
or neglect so to do, is 'Yell settled in this state. Miner
v. Ice Co., 93 )Iieh. 97, 33 N. '''"· 218, 17 L. R. A.
4:12. In the instant case the directors in control
are the parties charged 'Yi t h the ,yrongdoing; and,
under these facts, it 'yas unnecessary for the minority stockholder to make an effort to induce the directors in control to act. Robinson v. De Luxe
)Iotor Car Co .. 170 )Iich. 163, 135 N. W. 897. * * *
" ( 8, 9) It is urged that no individual interested in the corporation other than the complainants
received any benefits from the result of the litigation. The corporation) however, is a legal entity)
sepa.rrate and distinct from its individual stockholders) and) as the trial judge properly said) the question is not) c~Vhat is the advantage or disadvantage
restttlting to any stockholder or stockholders frorn
the la-ze suit) but to the corporation itself/ The corporate assets belong to the corporation for the purposes of the corporation) and no stockholder has any
right thereto until all the just claims against the
corporation are paid." ( Italics ours. )
As 'vas said by the Federal Circuit Court in Columbia
Nat. Sand Dredging Co. v. '\Tashed Bar Sand Dredging
Co. et al, 136 Fed. 710 at p. 711:
"There was no management on the part of the
board of directors, but its affairs were managed as
though they 1oere owned personally by Robert Pattersen. *
*
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-114"It is not alleged that the defendant company
is insolvent, but, upon the other hand, it is claimed
that a payment to it of the amount actually due by
the Pattersons and the Philadelphia Transportation
& Lighterage Company, together with the amount
which should have been paid in as capital of the
concern, would not only make the stock valuable,
but show a surplus belonging to the defendant company. * * *
"The bill does not allege that the plaintiff has
made a demand on the corporation or its officers to
collect the amount alleged to be due it from the
Philadelphia Transportation & Lighterage Company, nor for the collection of the amount due upon
the capital stock, nor has it made any other demands
upon the corporation, or any of its officers, to correct the mismanagement of the defendant company,
nor do we think that it was necessary for it to do
so in this case, as required by rule 94, as it is evident
that where the officers of the corporation are managing the concern entirely for their own profit) and
the benefits derived from the corporation find their
way) either directly through con tracts "~i th other
concerns of which they are the owners, into the
pockets of the officers) it is not necessary that the
plaintiff should make demand upon them before
filing its bill, as it manifest that such a demand
"'ould be unavailing. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. 8.
460, 26 L. Ed. 827; 'Veir v. Bay State Gas Co., (C.
C.) 91 Fed. 940; Wolf v. Penna. Railroad Co., 193
Pa. 91, 45 Atl. 936; Treat v. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 21,
52 Atl. 60.
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-115'~(\Hlrt~

w·ill not take the property of a corporation out of the possession of its owners at the suit
of a minorit~~ stockholder, 'vithout there is a very
graYe necessity therefor; but 1rhcre the facts recited
'lll a b-ill charging JnisJnanagentcnt shouJ that the
board of directors trho arc responsible for the 1nis1nanagerncnt arc the ,nzajority stockholders,, and that
they are managi·ng the corporation for their own
benefit, and direrting its funds and income to thernselres) the 1ninority stockholders) or any of them,
would be entitled to relief. either by inj~unction)
"~here that remedy could correct the evil, or) if
necessary) the appointnzent of a receiver) and the
majority stockholders who violated their trust
"~ould have no just cause of complaint." (Italics
ours.)
In Bankers' niortgage Co., v. Rupp, (C. C. A. 10) 66
F. (2d) 992 at p. 994, it is said:
"But a court of chancery may intervene and
through the appointment of a receiver depose officers and directors when it appears that they are
acting, or are about to act, in such manner as to
constitute fraud or a breach of trust, resulting or
reasonably calculated to result in injury to the
corporation and its stockholders. This case falls
squarely within that doctrine, universally recognized throughout the country. * * *
"Substantially all possible harm the appointInent of a receiver could do the busines:s of the corporation-conceding its peculiarly sensitive char-
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' -116acter-has been done. Continuation of the receivership, pending final determination of the case, could
not add substantially to the peril. Moreover, it is
apparent that the present officers, to whom management of the business would be restored if the
receivership were stayed, do not .enjoy the wholehearted confidence of the bondholders, the public,
or those charged with the administration of the Blue
Sky Law in the state of Kansas ;"
In Boothe v. Summit Coal l.Vlining Co., 55 "rash. 167,
104 Pac. 207, at pp. 210, 211, it is said:
"Although the appellant and R. ~J. Linden each
own one-half of the capital stock, the latter is in
exclusive possession. He arbitrarily conducts the
corporation business, makes book entries, declares
or refuses dividends, raises his own salary, retains
his subservient trustees in office, and through them,
perfor1ns s~tch corporate acts as he chooses. He and
Boothe are not partners, yet their relative position
created by their contract of sale is kindred to that
of partners. Linden has thereby obtained absolute
control of $25,000 in value of the appellant's estate,
which he is arbitrarily handling wjthout consulting
the appellant or granting him the least consideration. Such a condition i-s an intolerable one for the
a,ppellant and one that w~o~tl d not be pern~itted in u
pwrtnershiz). 'Vere their positions changed, Linden
would doubtless demand a receiver with as much
energy as he now opposes one. If they were part:q.ers, a receiver would unquestionably be granted.
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-117Xo rigl1ts of rreditor8, other stockholders, or third
parties are here invol Yed. The only real parties in
interest are Boothe and Robert J. Linden. As above
stated, their position is kindred to that of partners.
Present conditions trillu ndonbtedly co11tinne unless
a court of eqtn~ty affords relief. Should they continue f 11:e think not. * * *
··In the instant case there is no control of the
corporation by a board of trustees, sustained by a
majority of the stock, although originally the present board may haT"e been legally elected. In pract-ical operation there is no deliberati1;e board. R. J.
Linden lzas as full) complete) and dicta·torial control
as did Oudin in the case cited, and although the corporation here involved in solvent, such a condition
is inequitable and should not be permitted. It does
ciolence to the elen~entary idea that a corporation
is to be controlled by a governing board) representing a rnajority of the stock. No majority is in control nor can it obtain control/) (Italics ours.)
See the following cases re mismanagement by the
officers of corporations, viz :
)liner v. Bell Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W.
218•
' Bank et al v. Bailey, 29 Okla. 246,
Exchange
116 Pac. 812;
Columbia Nat. Sand Drudging Co. v. Washed
Bar Sand Dredging Co. et al, 136 Fed. 710;
State ex rel B. ~1. Consolidated C. M. Co. v.
Second Judicial District, 22 Mont. 222,
56 Pac. 219;
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-118Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 Pac. 485 at
page 489;
Backus v. Finkalstein, 23 Fed. (2d) 357;
Eldridge v. Payette-Boise Water Users Ass'n.,
285 Pac. 1039.

INSOLVENCY NEED NOT BE SHOWN

In High on Receivers, (4th Ed.) Sec. 295 (b) at page
357, it is said:
"And the relief has been granted although it
appeared that the corporation was quite solvent."
(Citing Jasper Land Company v. Wallis, 123 Ala.
652, 26 So. 659.)
Again, High on Receivers, p. 357 :
"So where the board of directors are a majority
of the stockholders and are grossly mismanaging
the affairs of the corporation and are conducting
the business for their own individual gain, the minority stockholders are entitled to the appointment
of a receiver although it appeared that the corporation was solvent." (Citing Columbia Nat. Sand
Dredging Company v. Washed Bar Sand Dredging
Company, 136 Fed. 710.)
In re Consolidated Distributors, 298 Fed. 859, holds
that insolvency of a corporation is not an essential pre-

requisite to the appointment of a receiver to conserve its
assets.
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In Lnhrig Colliers Co. v. Interstate Coal aiHl Dock
Company,

~~1

Fed. (}3B, the court said that it \Yas

"not necessary to allege that the corporation is
presently insolYent or even that, "'"hen properly
managed, it 'viii not haye a surplus for distribution
among stockholders. * * *
"The corporation may well be solvent if its
assets be nursed along, and insolvent if they be
thro"~n to the creditors for piece-meal sale."
In Rugger v. )lt. Hood Electric Co., 143 Ore. 193,
20 P. (2d) 4:12, the court said at p. 422:
".A. court of equity has jurisdiction to appoint

a receiver for solvent corporations at the instance
of stockholders, on the ground of fraud and mismanagement. 43 A. L. R. 246, and authorities there
cited; Baillie v. Gold Min. Co., 86 Or. 1, 166 P.
965, 167 p 1167."
0

In Bo""'en v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114
Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301, 43 A. L. R. 238, at pp. 241, 242,
it is said:

"The Legislature has authorized the appointment of a receiver in certain enumerated cases, and
'in all other cases where receivers have heretofore
been appointed by the usages of the courts of equity.'
Gen. Stat. 1915, Sec. 7164 (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 266)
subd. 6.
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-120"Courts of equity came into existence for the
purpose of affording such relief as justice and good
conscience required, under the peculiar circumstances of the case.- In some jurisdictions, instead
of keeping up with social progress, equity has set
and hardened. Its potency to meet new conditions
has been emasculated, and frequently the caution
to be displayed and the limitations to be observed
in appointing receivers loom so large that as the
Missouri court has observed, judicial hesitancy degenerates into judicial atrophy. Cantwell v. Columbia Lead Co., 199 Mo. 1, 97 S. vV. 167. In other
jurisdictions a better view is taken, and the phrase,
'by the usages of courts of equity,' means according
to the informing spirit of equity heretofore manifested in the appointment of receivers. * * *
"In Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 72 Pac. 733,
the Supreme Court of Idaho well said:
"'The early doctrine that the affairs of a corporation could not be inquired into except by permission of the Attorney General, and that courts
of equity should not interfere with the po"rer and
authority of the directors of a corporation because
that "rould result in its dissolution, has been modified to meet existing conditions. A large part of the
business of the world is done through corporations,
and it was held in Columbian Athletic Club v. State,
143 Ind. 98, 28 L. R. A. 727, 52 Am. St. Rep. 4:07,
40 N. E. 914, that the courts of equity should adapt
their practice as far as possible to the existing state
of society, and apply its jurisdiction to all those ne"r
cases which, from the progress daily making in the
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-121affnirs of men, n1ust continually arise, and should
not fron1 too striet an adherence to the forms and
rules established under Yery different circumstances,
decline to administer justice and to enforce rights
for "Thich there is no other remedy.'"
In the annotation to the above case, 43 A. L. R. at p.
2±6, it is said:
'~X otwithstanding

the fact that there has occasionally been some judicial expression of opinion
to the contrary, the rule 'is now well settled that a
court of equity has inherent jurisdiction) at the
instance of the stockholders, in a proper case) to
appoint a recei rer for a solt·en t corporation) on the
ground of fraud, gross misrnanagement) or dissensions among the stockholders, directors, or officers,
if there is no other adequate remedy. (In general,
the cases here cited are those of solvent going corporations, or at least their support of the ·rule indicated is not dependent on a contrary condition.)"
(Citing numerous cases. Italics ours.)
Stevens v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. & Imp. Co., 14
Utah 232, J7 Pac. 81, is one of the cases "rhich is cited in
43 A. L. R. 246-2-±8 in support of the above quoted annota-

tion.

SYSTEMATIC AND HABITUAL EVIL PRACTICES

It is true that in Fletcher on Corporations, Vol. 16,
at p. 172, the author states that,
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"before a court of equity will appoint a receiver of
a corporation which is a going and prosperous concern, and is neither insolvent nor in danger of insolvency, because it does things which are dishonest,
the evil practices must be systematic and habitual
and so interwoven as to become a part of the general
business/) (Italics ours.)

ACCOUNTING

The stockholders, having put their money in the corporation, and having supplied all its capital, are entitled
to know how their money has been and is being used.
Beckstead, as manager of the corporation, is only a
trustee and he is required to account to the owners for the
manner in which he has discharged his trust.
The stockholders are entitled to know the true state
of the finances and the true condition of the corporation.
The sworn testimony of Beckstead respecting tb ese
matters will not suffice.
It is not the swearing but it is the creditable swearing
which establishes facts in a lawsuit.
The hearing which plaintiffs "\Yere given in the court
below was neither an accounting nor a substitution for an
accounting.

It served only to place before the chancellor

the facts showing the general need and necessity for an
accounting.
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In Bancroft's Code Praetice and Remedies, '""olume
:- .
43-·~
- 'l•"l
. sa1"d :
6, ~ec.
· •-. p. ~~
-· 1•t. Is
""Courts of equity haYe al,vays asserted jurisdiction over an accounting \vhere fiduciary relations
exist betvreen the parties, whether of partnership
or in some other manner. ...\nd if an action involves
a long and complicated account, the court has jurisdiction regardless of the legal relationship between
the parties.~·
In Cyclopedia of La",. and Procedure, Volume 1, p.
436, it is said :
"The bill must state the facts upon which complainant is entitled to call upon defendants to
render an account, and which make defendants
liable to do so. But it is sufficient to show the relation of the parties which entitled complainant to
the relief, and the general statement of the matters
pertaining to "Thich the account is sought will be
sufficient. The items of the account need not be
stated, and where the issues necessary involve a
general accounting the evidence need not be confined to the claims set up by either party."
Again in Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Volume
1, p. 439:

"A general prayer for an accounting is sufficient to call defendant to account in the character
in which he is charged and for the matters embraced
'vithin the relief made proper by the allegations of
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-124the bill. And so, if a proper case is presented for
an accounting of particular matters, the account
may be taken under a general prayer for relief."
In Corpus Juris Secund urn, Vol. 1, Section 38, subdivision ( 7), p. 671, it is said:
"Plaintiff may have relief under a general
prayer to the extent justified by the facts pleaded."
Appellants throughout their brief have sought to
merge the identity of Beckstead Livestock Company, a
Wyoming corporation, with· the identity of United Bond
and Finance, a Utah corporation.
The courts are most reluctant to disregard the doctrine of corporate entities and a corporation is ordinarily
considered as a 'vholly separate entity from its stockholders.
In Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 Fed. 478, at
p. 487, the court said :
"Few questions of law are better settled than
that a corporation is ordinarily a wholly separate
entity from its stockholders, whether they be one
or more. (Citing cases) Likewise, we think it must
be conceded that neither ownership of all of the
stock of one corporation by another, nor the identity
of officers in one with officers in another, creates
a merger of the two corporations into a single entity,
or makes one either the principal or agent of the
other." (Citing cases)
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-123~-\t pa~e

61 of their brief appellants boldly state that

the records and exhibits s lHnY respecting the four ranches
and liYestock standing in the name of Beckstead Livestock
Company,
"That the ranches are stocked with 2,000 high
grade sheep and approximately 350 head of pure
bred and high grade Hereford cattle, and tha.t the
entire indebtedness on this large enterprise is less
than $14,000.00.)) (Italics ours.)
"re presume appellants 'Yill allo'Y plaintiffs a credit
for the 1102 head of sheep sold by Beckstead for $5,300.00
"?hile the trial was in progress, which would reduce the
number to 998.
The mortgage indebtedness alone against the Wyoming ranches is in excess of $14,000.00.
In addition, every foot of land, every hoof of livestock
and every piece of property standing in the name of Beckstead Livestock Company "'"as acquired with money and
assets 'Yhich belonged solely to United Bond and Finance
Corporation.
What is the amount of money and what is the value
of the property of United Bond that was used for the above
purposes?
How much money is owing United Bond for funds advanced to the liYestock company

"~ith

'Yhich to pay its

operating expenses and losses?
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-126'Vhen and how is this money so advanced to be paid
back to the United Bond?
The affairs of these two corporations must be thoroughly gone into and a full and complete accounting must
be had.

''re venture that such accounting will show an

outstanding unpaid indebtedness of the Beckstead Livestock Company considerably nearer the sum of $94,000.00
than the figure of $14,000.00 stated at p. 61 of appellants'
brief.
In Trustees System of Penn. v. Payne, 65 F. (2d)
103, 107, the court held that a receiver would be granted in
equity over a solvent subsidiary as ancillary to a receivership in equity.

This is recognized as an extension of the

doctrine as theretofore applied by courts of equity.

The

court said:
"It is recognized in principal that the fiction of
corporate entity may be disregarded when one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs: are so conducted that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation.
(Citing cases * * * Through long practice courts
have not hesitated to disregard the doctrine of corporate entities when the facts justify it. Although \Ye
know of no instance in which it has been done in
matters of receivership, we cannot see why the same
power does not exist in a court or why the law doe8
not impose upon a court the sante duty in a receivership matter when) as here) the facts are S'ubsta HSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-127tial enongh to justif!l· indeed to con1pel) a finding
that the fire corporations n-crc so ident~ified with
the parent corporation as to be a part of it. Being
of opinion that the law' nzakes no e.x·ception of recei.rershi.ps. lC'e tea-r asu ndcr the lega,l nza.~·e of corporate fiction in lrh ich they hare enveloped themselYes and, observing that the six corporations were
not merely related by stock o"~nership but, like
wheels in a machine, ".,.ere so closely meshed that all
functioned together, " . . e find from the bills that in
legal effect they \Yere one, a finding in consonance
\Yith the casual statement of the attorney for the
parent corporation at the hearing that 'the whole
thing from .AJabama to Pennsylvania is really one
company.' " (Italics ours.)
In Commerce Trust Co. v.

-n: oodbury, 77 F.

( 2d) 478,

at p. 487, the court said:
"": e are constrained by the uncontradicted
facts to the conclusion that the sales company was,
as it was controlled, and as it functioned, merely
an agency or department of the lumber company.
All of its assets ""'ere furnished, and all of its stock
O'\Yned by the lumber company, its officers, directors,
and its main office were the same as those of the
lumber company, and its employees had, for the
most part, formerly been employees of the lu1nber
company. But the strongest undisputed facts constraining us to this conclusion are that the president of the lumber company had the power to vote
all of the stock of the sales company, and aside from
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-128this po"rer, which was not of itself unusual, had the
po"rer to remove any officer or director of the sales
company without cause or notice, and to dominate
and control performance of its contracts.. * * *
( Citing cases)
"In such situation, there are cases which hold
that a receiver of the parent company, under the
order of the court, may take over the property of
the subsidiaries which fall into the banned category
above described and administer such property, as
the property of the parent company.,, (Citing cases)
In Texas Co. v. Roos, (C. C. A. 5) 93 F. ( 2d) 380, at
pp. 382, 383, the court said :
"It is immaterial whether the dividends were
declared and paid specifically for the purpose of
defrauding appellee and defeating his claim, or for
the purpose of avoiding taxes, as was stated in argument. A person is presumed to intend the natural
and probable consequences of his act. The lower
court found that any prudent person should have
known, as both corporations did know, that the payment of such dividends. would result in insolvency,
and prevent the appellee from collecting his judgment from the l\1exican Company. It had exactly
that effect, and both corporations are prresurned to
have intended to defraud the appellee and defeat
the payment of his cla.in~. * * * The payment
of these dividends should be avoided and set aside,
as to appellee, as a fraud upon his rights. Equity
has full power to grant relief. Ignoring the corpo-
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-129rate entity, the court below \Yent to the heart of the
matter and did justice by granting a decree against
the Dela\Yare Corporation;,, (Citing cases; italics
ours.)
.At p. 73 of their brief appellants comment on Beckstead's cross examination, wherein, in substance, he said:
"if this stock had been allo"\"\Ted and permitted to
remain in the hands of stockbrokers, no doubt expensive and serious litigation zcould have been commenced long prior to the filing of the co1nplaint
herein.''

vrhy should Beckstead, or the manager of any legitimate company, care

"~ ho

purchases or holds its stock?

If the corporation is handling its business properly,if it confines its business and investments within the limits
of its corporate purposes,-if it keeps accurate books and
if these books honestly reflect its transactions and if proper
accounting is made of all moneys received and expended,
why should such a corporation fear that if its stock had
been permitted to remain in the hands of stockbrokers,
that "expensive and serious litigation" "rould surely result?
Do not the remarks of Beckstead above referred to
indicate that, as manager of the corporation, he knows
there is something 1Dron.q "Thich will prove "serious" if
aired out in a court of justice?
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--130vVe fear that Beckstead's fears) as above expressed,
may be exceptionally well founded, and this shows further
need for an immediate accounting.
The bonds and obligations of a solvent corporation
should be redeemed by it at 100 cents on the dollar.

If

Beckstead's corporation is as solvent as he says, what excuse has he, then, for trading for and buying up the company's bonds and obligations for only sixty cents on the

,,
,.'.1

dollar?
How long will the public deal with and invest money
in an "investment" company that acquires the reputation
of paying no dividends, no interest, and only paying back
$600 of a $1000 investment?
How· long can such an "investment" company continue
in the investment business and remain solvent?
Who "\vould now purchase a nickel's worth of stock in
the corporation knowing the present stockholders had paid
a premium of 25lf0 or 35% or 50ro above the par or book
value of their stock, dependent upon whether they had paid
Beckstead therefor at $125 or $135 or $150 per unit?
Who would buy any units of stock if inforn1ed that he
would never· acquire a vote or voice in the selection of the
officers or in the management of the affairs of the corporation?
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-131,,~ho "~ill

inYest 1noney in n corpo1·a tion that hasn ,t

paid dl\idends for oYer ten years·?
'''"ho \Yould purchase stock in the company knowing
that there are only 572 shares of voting stock outstanding
and that 512 of these are o'vned and held by the manager
and his

"~ife "?

-nrho

"~ill

inYest money in a company "rhose manager

has, in \iolation of the Constitution and statutes, exchanged and traded his company's stock for stock in other
corporations opera ted by a brother-in -la"'"
Appellants are called upon on this appeal to supply
the correct answers to the above questions.
That the trial court "'"as deeply conce:fned with these
matters is shown by the question it asked of the defendant
Beckstead, and of W'hich appellants, at p. 228 of their brief,
complain that,
"The only implication one can draw from this
question is that the Court believed in his own mind
that there "'"ere reasons other than the inability of
the purchaser to keep up his payments, and that
these reasons reflected upon the honor, honesty and
integrity of the defendants to this action." (Italics
ours.)
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CONCLUSION
The stockholders have put their money into the corporation for which units. of stock were issued to them.
This money has all been paid to Beckstead and his associa tes for the corporate business.
For every unit of stock purchased by them these stockholders have paid Beckstead a premium for commissions
of either 25 lf0 , 35 lfo or 50 lfo over and above the one hundred dollar par value of the Preferred stock.
Beckstead and his salesmen came first and paid thenlselves in full out of the very first money paid by the subscribers of the stock.

Thus did Beckstead and his sales-

men, during the entire stock-selling campaign, reap their
harvest by receiving not less than $25 and at times as
much as $50 on each unit of s:tock sold.
The balance of the stockholders' money, remaining
after payment to Beckstead of his commission, was received
by Beckstead to be used for and to constitute the capital
of the corporation for investment purposes.
As to this money of the stockholders in the amount of
$100 per unit, the board of directors of the corporation are
"but trustees of an estate for all of the stockholders".

(Cantwell et al. v. Columbia Lead Co., 97 S. W. 167
at p. 179.)
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The plaintiff stockholders are entitled to kno\v what
their trustees haYe done \Yith the money so delivered to
such trustees and comprising the trust estate.
The only class of stock \Yhich has interested Beckstead is the Common Class ...-\. rot-ing stock.

Without pay-

ing any money into the trust estate \vhatever therefor,
he has had issued to himself a total of 512 shares of this
class of stock, and in 1933 he caused 511 of these shares to
be transferred from his o'vn name to the name of his wife,
~Irs.

Stella C. Beckstead.
These 512 shares of Common Class A voting stock so

issued to Beckstead and his wife, without consideration)
does not rightfully belong to them.

At all times it has

been and still is tlle property of the corporation and such
of its shareholders as have paid real money for the respective interests

"~hich

they have acquired in the corporation.

'Vhat will an accounting show that Beckstead has
done with the moneys and assets of the trust estate?
This query may not be answered until a complete ac-

cottnting is bad.

At present plaintiffs' only information

comes from the fragmentary and disconnected testimony
elicited at the trial of this case, as is revealed by the record
herein.
Certain assets of the corporation, being certificates
of stock therein, Beckstead exchanged and traded for
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-13411,800 shares of stock in American Keene Cement & Plaster

Company. A certificate for 6800 shares of such stock was
issued direct to United Bond and :E"'inance Corporation,
and a certificate for the remainder was on the same day
issued to Beckstead, individually. This whole transaction
is illegal.

It is expressly prohibited by Section 5, Article

XII, of the Constitution and 103-12-4, subd. 5, R. S. Utah.

Assets of the corporation in the amount of $85,158.5±
have been used by Beckstead in buying up the corporation's
own stock. This, likewise, is an illegal transaction. It is
prohibited by both Constitution and statutes, as was decided by this court in Pace v. Pace Bros.) 91 Utah 132.
All this stock of the corporation was bought by it at

large and unconscionable discounts, being another illegal
transaction expressly prohibited by 103-12-4, subd. 3, R. S.
Utah.
While the total of the book or par value of the corporation's own stock so bought by Beckstead with the assets
of the trust estate is $203,087.11, yet this value is achieved
by figuring the Preferred stock at only $100 per share.
None of the stockholders \Vho put real money in the stock
received any of it at book or par value. They were required
to pay the commissions of Beckstead and his salesmen of
from $25 to $50 per unit in addition to the par value. Thus
the real and actual investment in money of the stockholders in their stock so re-purchased by the corporation is
greatly in excess of the sum of $203,087.11.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ji

-135llad the8e transal'tions been legitimatP ones, had it
been Beckstead's intention to permit the re1naining stockholders to share in the .. profits .. of these unlawful activities, 'Yhy did Beckstead not cancel the stock certificates
so purchased and issue ne"? ones to his corporation in lieu
thereof?
''""hy did the manager, Beckstead, permit this vast
amount of stock to ""accumulate" uncancelled) but endorsed
in bla 11 k) in "a little pouch'' \Yithout transfer or reissue,

until this most serious litigation \Yas precipitated?
\\'"hy should the books and records, including the stock

record of this corporation, not reflect the true condition
and the actual transactions of the corporation at all times?
-nrhy should Beckstead wait eight years before transferring or reissuing the certificates of stock which he acquired in 1931 from the witnesses, Mrs. Mayme 'Vilson,
Henry Hoffman, Pearl Jackson and other stockholders,
too numerous to mention.
'v'"ith assets of the trust estate, Beckstead acquired
and purchased the automobiles "'hich he drove; the four
separate homes in \Yhich he and his family lived in exclusive residential sections of Salt Lake City; an insurance
agency; the controlling stock in Ashton-Jenkins Company;
the Densley-Beckstead sheep; the Wyoming ranches and
livestock and a large amount of other property \Vhich we
cannot here mention.
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-136\Vhy should Beckstead take and use the moneys of
the trust estate to purchase, in partnership with Densley,

:rJI

a band of sheep and thereupon earmark these sheep with
his own tags?
vVhat right had Beckstead to agree that the profits
to result from this sheep venture should accrue, not to the

.:~

corporation, nor to the trust estate, but that they should

:~

be profit to him, individually?

·r~

vVhat right had Beckstead to use the funds and assets
of the estate to acquire land and other property and take
title thereto in his own name, individually?
Each and every one of these transactions, in both fact
and law, constituted a conversion of the trust

~state

by

Beckstead.
When a person brands the cattle and horses of another
·with a brand recorded in his name, individually, and when,
\vith aluminum tags bearing his name, he tags the sheep
of another, ordinarily such person may not be said to be
engaging in either an idle act nor an innocent pastime.
By such acts he places upon such personal property
his badge of ownership.

Thereby he not only di-stinctly

claims ownership, but he actually establishes a prirna facie
ti tie in himself which all persons thereafter dealing with
the property so branded and ear marked must recognize.
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-137Such distinct
oYer another

acb~

person~~

of tloininion so "·r<ntgfnlly exerte<l

property, being in denial of and in-

consistent "?ith the latter's right therein, constitute conversion. Conversion by a fiduciary constitutes larceny.
From the year 1931 Beckstead has never missed a
pay day.

He receives from the corporation a most sub-

stantial salary to manage its affairs.

His salary on the

very day these lines are "rritten is $100.00 per week.
For this he should 'York for the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.

He should be engaged in

more "?orthy endeavors than trading the stockholders out
of their stock and treating the assets of the corporation
and of the trust estate as though same and all thereof
were his indi cidual property.
The stockholders have been most kind to

Beckste~d,

but with W'"hat coin has he repaid them?
Just so long as the corporation continues to be dominated and controlled by Beckstead will its affairs continue
to be grossly mismanaged.

No stockholder has any hope

now of ever receiving back or realizing any appreciable
amount of the money which he originally put into the company. ''Tith Beckstead in the saddle they 'vill never receive
any dividends on their stock or earnings on their inyestments.
No court should and no court will tolerate such ruthless and unfair treatment of stockholders.
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Beckstead's own testimony standing alone convicts
him of gros.s mismanagement and of evil, systematic,
habitual and unlawful practices.
If there were no other testimony in this entire record
than his admissions and state1nents, there would be ample
proof for a court to displace him with its own officer, a
receiver, to order a complete accounting, to restrain defendants and to award the stockholders the other relief
for which they pray.
The affairs of this corporation cannot,-they must
not remain in the hands of Wesley R. Beckstead. He has
already remained too long in the saddle. His day is done.
He must be unseated.
The great wonder is that the corporation has survived
such gross mismanagement as long as it has.
This fleecing of poor investors of their hard-earned
savings must be stopped.
Great and lasting injustice has already been done
these people.
Courts of justice most certainly are not impotent to
grant relief· upon the showing of such systematic and
habitual evil practices.
See:
(Decision herein on merits by Judge Schiller
of Jan. 2, 1941, and decision denying motion for a
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-139ne"? trial herein by Judge EYans of
. .-\ppendix to this brief.)
. .\s "yas said in Cant,vell, et al.

Y.

~larch

19, 1941.

Columbia Lead Co.,

97 S. "'"· 167 at p. 179:

"But when all this has been said, it may further be said that this court has never denied power
in a chancellor to prevent a scheme of irreparable
injury and "yrong merely because the movers in that
scheme speak and act in a corporate capacity rather
than in an indindual capacity."
The court's decree and its order appointing a receiver
are fully warranted by both the pleadings and proof herein.
The appeal being 'Yithout merit, the judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
IRVINE) SKEEN & THURMAN
L. DELOS DAINES

of Salt Lake City) Utah
LESTER H. LOBLE

R. ADAIR
of Helena) Montana

HUGH

Attorneys for Respondents
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APPENDIX
Decision on Merits by Judge Schiller

January 2) 1941
I~

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH,
I:N .A.ND FOR SALT LAKE COlJNTY

R. D. TOBIN, etc.,

Plaintiff)

vs.
UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CORPORATION, a
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

DECISION OF THE COURT

Case No. 65072
In this case, the plaintiffs who are non-resident stockholders of the defendant, United Bond and Finance Corporation, seek a decree of this Court ordering, among other
things, that the defendants. account to the United Bond
and Finance Corporation for all money and property
"illegally and wrongfully diverted from the defendant,
United Bond and Finance Co1nporation" and that a receiver be appointed for the corporation. All of the defendants,
except Egbert Pandolfo, appeared anu answered.
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-142Prior to the trial on the merits, a protracted hearing
was had on the plaintiffs' order to show cause why a receiver pendente lite should not be appointed. The hearing
consumed more than three trial weeks and resulted in a
voluminous record. A motion V\ras then made by the plaintiffs for a preferential setting of the case and the Court
gran ted the motion. At the time of the trial on the Ineri ts,
counsel for the respective parties stipulated that the evidence offered at the hearing on the order to show cause,
subject to the same objections as made at the time of the
latter hearing, might be considered by the Court as the
evidence at the trial on the merits.

It was further stipu-

lated that additional evidence might be offered in the
discretion of counsel, and that any witness who testified
at the prior hearing might be further interrogated and
subjected to further cross-examination at the trial. Little
additional evidence, however, ·was offered at the trial.
Because of the nature of the issues, the Court granted
to both sides wide latitude ""ith respect to the proof. The
plaintiffs do not contend that the United Bond and

I~"'i

nance Corporation (hereafter simply called "the corporation") is insolvent. They do contend, however, that dating
back to 19-31, there has been a continuous course of misconduct on the part of the corporation's directors and particularly on the part of the defendant, W. R. Beckstead,
which has \Yorked to the detriment of the corporation and
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-143of the stockholders; that approxin1ately one-third of the
corporation's

propert~~

ha8 been transferred to the defend-

ant, Beckstead Livestock Company, a Wyoming corporation, organized by Beckstead; that while the stock of the·
Wyoming corporation is ,yholly o"rned by the United Bond
and

~-,inance

Corporation, yet the funds of the two com-

panies have been intermingled and it is impossible to
ascertain from the records of either company the financial
status of the '''"yoming company; that approximately 90
per cent. of all the outstanding voting stock of the corporation is under the control of the defendant, Beckstead,
",.ho utilizes his power to control a "dummy" board of
directors and the affairs of the corporation to the detriment of the corporation and of the stockholders.
The evidence establishes that the corporation (first
known as the United States Bond and Finance Corporation) ·was organized by Beckstead and two associates on
or about September 27, 1927, with an authorized capital
stock of 500 shares of common stock with no par value and
500 shares of preferred stock of a par value $100.00 per
share, the latter stock to receive dividends at the rate of
$7.00 per annum.

One hundred shares of each kind of

stock was subscribed, according to the articles of incorporation, by the incorporators and $1000.00 'Yas paid in.
Beckstead testified that he personally drew the articles
of incorporation.
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-144A series of an1endments to the articles increased the
amount of capital stock and divided it into various classes.
After the last of these amendments affecting the capital
stock, the structure was as follows :
1000 shares Common Class A stock, no par value.
10000 shares Common Class AA stock, no par value.
7500 shares Preferred stock, par value $100.00 per

share.
5000 shares Common Class B stock, no par value.

The holders of Common Class A stock have the exclusive voting rights in the corporation and, therefore, the
exclusive right to select the directors, officers and agents
of the corporation and to control the affairs and establish
the policy of the corporation.

By the year 1933, 90 per

cent. of this stock exclusive of that held by the corporation, stood in the name of Stella C. Beckstead, wife of the
defendant, W. R. Beckstead. One share each was held by
Beckstead, Spillsbury and Evans 'Yho now constitute the
board of directors..

There is no satisfactory evidence in

the record establishing what value, if any, Beckstead or
his wife gave for this stock.
It follows that at least since the year 1933, and very
likely much earlier than that, Beckstead and his wife have
had exclusive control of the corporation.

Spillsbury, who

testified at the first hearing, knows little, if anything, of
the affairs of the corporation and has acquiesced in all
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-145deals of the corporation
attention.

\Y hich

hay ha Ye been called to his

It is also fair to conclude from the evidence,

that Evans, "Tho is the bookkeeper for the company and
"~ho

paid nothing for his share of Class A Common Stock,

is likew"ise a "dummy'' director \Yho does the bidding of
Beckstead.
The original articles of incorporation provided for a
board of seYen directors.

It is significant that after

trouble had arisen with the Montana stockholders, the
"holders~'

of Class . :\..
. Common stock, on February 2, 1940,

amended the articles reducing the number of directors to
three, and further amending Article X which read: "Three
members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quorum with authority to transact the affairs of the corporation" by striking that article and substituting a new article
which provides that two members of the board shall constitute a quorum.

Thus Beckstead with the concurrence

of his bookkeeper, may now transact the business and control the affairs of the corporation which in truth is what
the evidence discloses to be the fact.
During the first years of the corporation's existence,
an active campaign to sell "units" of the corporation stock
was carried on by Beckstead and his associates.

nTontana

residents invested large sums in the corporate stock. But
early in the campaign Class A Comon stock was withheld
from investors and non-voting Class AA Common stock
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-146was sold to them.

By this method .the investors who put

real money into the corporation were wholly disenfranchised.

During those years, the corporation filed a num-

ber of statements with the Clerk of Salt Lake County (as
required by Utah law) in which it stated the nature of the
corporation's business variously as follows: "Bond and
Finance Corporation"; "Selling bonds of the corporation
secured by first mortgages on real property and in dealing
in com1nercial paper, contracts, etc."; "The selling of First
Mortgage Bonds and Capital

Stoc~

making of First Mortgage loans";

of the corporation and
"~1ortgage

Loan and

Finance".
In 1931, a course of conduct at variance with the announced business of the corporation was initiated by Beckstead and his then collaborator, James C. Hill. A "phantom" corporation known as Investors Thrift Company was
organized with Beckstead and Hill as principal directors.
The evidence discloses that Beckstead and Hill then had
transferred to themselves as individuals certain real estate
contracts of purchase owned by United Bond and Finance
Company, which they, in turn, assigned to Investors Thrift
Company in exchange for stock in the last named corporation.

No consideration ever passed, so far as the evi-

dence discloses, from Backstead and Hill to the United
Bond and Finance Company at the time they accepted the
real estate contracts. That the purpose of organizing the
Investors Thrift Company, was to trade stockholders of the
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-1-!7United Bond and Finance eorporation out of their stock
and that such purpose "·as aecon1plished in a number of
instances is amply borne out by the evidence in the case.
:Xot content "·ith this, Beckstead devised the scheme to
trade those "·ho had become stockholders of Investors
Thrift company out of their stock by a further exchange of
questionable securities and whiskey warehouse receipts.
'Yhen the grossly dishonest purposes of the Investors
Thrift Company had been accomplished, this company was
dissolved, the real estate contracts were reassigned to the
defendant corporation, and the books of the "phantom"
corporation "disappeared" although a small portion of
them, some slightly burned on the edges, appear to have
fallen into the hands of the plaintiffs and were used at
the trial.
In managing the affairs of the defendant corporation
Beckstead caused the stockholders to become discouraged
and then armed salesmen and security pickers with "sucker
lists" of his stockholders and investors in Utah, Nevada
and

~Iontana.

It is a reasonable inference from the evi-

dence that Beckstead knew and condoned the trading of
worthless or questionable securities for the stock of the
corporation's stockholders.

And it is established that

contrary to Utah law, (Pace v. Pace Brothers Oo1npany_,
91 Utah, 132) he utilized funds of the company to purchase
stock so obtained, from these sales.men.

As a result of
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these dealings a series of lawsuits have been filed and are
pending at the present time.

'1(

It is true that these illegal purchases of the stock
have tapered off recently, particularly since the year 1936,
although in the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, such purchases
were still being consummated.
During the earlier years of the corporation's existence,
stock and bonds of the corporation 'vere sold under installment contracts.

Some of the subscribers defaulted and

the amounts which they had paid in were forfeited.

The

audits produced in court do not disclose what happened to
the forfeited payments and no books were produced from
which the disposition of these funds could be ascertained.
During the life of the Investors Thrift Company, an
insurance agency was purchased by Beckstead 'Yith corporation funds, but the evidence does not disclose whether
a profit was gained or a loss sustained by this venture.
The same situation prevails with respect to the purchase
of the controlling stock of Edward E. Jenkins in the Ashton-Jenkins Company at a time when the latter company
was in financial difficulties.
In the last several years, Beckstead has caused approximately one-third of the corporation's assets to be
invested in cattle ranches and cattle in the State of Wyon1ing.

In the first instance the deeds to the Wyoming land

'vere taken in the name of Beckstead and his wife although
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-1-!9funds of the defendant eorpo1·a tion \Yere used to purchase
the land.

Later the Beckstead

incorporated in ·yvyoming.

I.~iYestock

Company was

Beckstead and two of his

associates "·ere chosen directors and all of the treasury
stock of the -nTyoming company "·as is.sued to them. The
stock certificates and the stubs for this original issue are
missing from the improYised stock book of the 'Vyoming
company.

Later, ho,Yever, the entire capital stock was

transferred to the United Bond and :F'inance Corporation,
leaving the directors with no qualifying shares.

Thus, at

the time ".hen the hearing on the order to show cause in
this case was held, the -nryoming corporation was functioning "·ith a board of directors who could not qualify.
Between this hearing and the trial on the meritg three
qualifying shares were transferred without consideration
to Beckstead and associates so that they might legally
qualify as directors of the 'Vyoming corporation.
That Beckstead was and is handling the Wyoming
corporation as though it were his private property is established by the evidence.

He is interested in ranching and

stockraising. No separate books were kept of the livestock
company until recently.

In 1939, according to the last

audit of the United Bond and Finance Comporation, it
held a note in the sum of $28,000.00 ""hich had been executed by the livestock company and Beckstead and his
bookkeeper are uncertain as to whether or not this repre-
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-150sented the total indebtedness of the livestock company.
]""~urthermore

the funds of the two corporations have been

commingled, the income from the lTtah corporation being
used to pay expenses at the ranches and at other times the
wool and lamb crops being used to discharge taxes and
other obligations of the Utah corporation.

Because of

this jumbling of accounts, it is impossible to determine
whether or not either the Utah or the Wyoming corporation is being operated at a profit or a loss.
The most serious result of the taking of large sums
of United Bond and Finance Company assets and investing them in Wyoming cattle ranches-a far cry from the
announced original purposes of the corporation-has. been
that it has. resulted in a corporation which possesses a
"split personality." The money invested in Wyoming has
been removed still further from the disenfranchised stockholders of the Utah corporation and these non-voting stockholders may be powerless to prevent Beckstead not only
from diverting one-third of the assets of the United Bond
and Finance Corporation into the ranching corporation,
but also fron1 diverting one-half or all of the assets if he
should so choose. If this were done, the Utah corporation
would become merely the record owner of the stock in the
Wyoming corporation and Beckstead might 'vithout interference experiment with his ranching hobby in Wyoming.
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-151{Tnder these circumstances can a court of equity rightfull~·

intervene and appoint n receiver or must it acknowl-

edge that it is powerless to protect the minority stockholders?
Counsel for the defendants have presented to the Court
two excellent briefs on the facts and on the law of this case
"yhich have been carefully studied by the Court.

The de-

fendants contend that the complaint does not state a cause
of action ; that the primary relief sought is the appointment of a receiver which is not allowable under Utah law,
since the appointment of a receiver is ancillary to an action
w·hich is pending for other purposes; that the evidence
does not sustain the issues raised by the pleadings and is
too remote; and that the plaintiffs have been guilty of
laches.
These briefs are striking examples of the difference in
approach of the advocate and the judge to a legal problem.
The one engages in the contest to win; the other endeavors
to decide justly and in accordance with the law. It is ofttin1es impossible, therefore, for the advocate to see any
point of vie\v other than that of his client.

To an extent,

this is desirable for it makes. for a vigorous advocacy of
the client's case and this Court not only admires but believes in the aggressive and vigorous presentation of a
ease. But the Court must see both sides of the controversy
and must weigh all the conflicting factors.
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With the statements of the law in the defendants'
brief the Court is in general agreement. It is in the application of these principles to the facts in this case, that the
Court cannot agree with defendants' counsel.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not spoken on
the matter, this Court will agree with defendants' counsel
that under statutes such as ours (Section 104-20-1), the
appointment of a receiver is probably permissible only in
a pending action in which some other relief is asked in
addition to the appointment of a receiver. In other words,
under our code the appointment of a receiver is ancillary
remedy in aid of the primary object of the litigation.
Furthermore such relief must be germane to the principal
suit.
A careful analysis of the plaintiffs' complaint leads
to the conclusion that it sufficiently states a cause of action
for an accounting the proof in this case, although broad,
is gern1ane to that issue.

Defendants' counsel refuse to

draw any reasonable and permissible inferences from the
testimony given that would in any way sustain this issue.
But the Court, if it is the trier of facts, is entitled to draw
from the evidence reasonable and justifiable inferences.
The Court believes: that not only does the complaint state
a cause of action for an accounting, but that the plaintiffs
have sustained their burden by a preponderance of the
evidence.
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-153This being the primary issue, is there any legal necessity for the appointn1ent of a receiver? It is the law that
a receiver may be appointed at the instance of minority
stockholders in cases of gross mismanagement or evil conduct on the part of the directors even though the corporation is not insolvent. The appointment of a receiver, however, is often a question of extreme nicety and requires the
exercise of sound judgment.

The Court must weigh the

violated rights and the hazardous position of the minority
stockholders against the right of a solvent corporation to
continued existence under its present management.

It

must decide "\Yhether or not the appointment of a receiver
will protect those rights or merely cause the "civil" death
of the corporation with consequent loss to all stockholders.
Past mismanagement and evil acts on the part of the
director "\vho is managing the business as a private enterprise will not, in and of itself, be sufficient for the appointment of a receiver.

Says Fletcher in Vol. 16 of his work

on ((Corporations-'-' at page 172:
"-before a court of equity will appoint a receiver
of a corporation which is a going and prosperous
concern, and is neither insolvent nor in danger of
insolvency, because it does things which are dishonest, the evil practices must be systematic and
habitual and so interwoven as to become part of the
general business.-'-' (Underscoring ours.)
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-154The evil practices have not ceased in the instant case
and are intimately interwoven in the course now being
pursued through the abstracting of assets from the corporation in which these plaintiffs invested their money and
placing these assets in a corporation of doubtful soundness and which is wholly beyond the control of anyone
except Beckstead. Such conduct if persisted in, can well
scuttle the Utah corporation.
The claim that the plaintiffs have been guilty of laches
in not demanding an accounting earlier does not take into
consideration the realities of the situation.

These plain-

tiffs all live in another state from which the corporation
withdrew after securing their money.

They have not bad

the opportunity to keep in close contact with the operation
of the corporation nor to obtain exact knowledge of the
business methods employed.

Their first opportunity has

come during the trial of this action.

It cannot therefore,

be said that they are guilty of laches.
The order of this Court is that the individual defendants account to this Court within 30 days from the signing
of the decree for all transactions had respecting the forfeiture of installment sale contracts on stocks and bonds;
for the transactions involving the purchase of the insurance company and the purchase of the controlling stock
of Edward E. Jenkins in the Ashton Jenkins Company;
for all transactions had and money advanced to Beckstead
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-155Livestock Company; that a break-down of the valuation
of the present yarious real estate holdings of the corporation be furnished together 'Yi th an accounting of the operation costs and rents of these holdings.
The court grants the petition for the appointment of a
recei"ler "ith the customary powers of a receiver in such
cases, to take and keep possission of the corporation's property, to receiYe rents, to collect debts, to compound and
compromise the same, to make transfers and generally to
do such acts respecting the property as the Court may
authorize.
The Court appoints Tracy Loan & Trust Company of
Salt Lake City, Utah, to be the receiver of the corporation.
The officers of this company have been contacted by the
Court and they have indicated that their company is willing to accept the trust.

The Court finds that Tracy Loan

& Trust Company is a fit and proper party so to act, since

it in no "'"ay is connected with any of the parties litigant
and is in a position to act impartially as between the
parties and is so organized and staffed that it can perform
its duties expeditiously and efficiently.
It is the Court's belief, from reading of the cases, that
the plaintiffs have prematurely asked for the allowance
of attorneys' fees. This issue is reserved without prejudice
to the plaintiffs' right seasonably to renew the request in
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-156the court having supervision of the receivership and the
enforcement of the Court's decree.
Counsel for the plaintiffs are requested to prepare,
Sierve and present, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
order and decree in conformity to this decision.
Dated, January 2, 1941.
HERBERT

M. SCHILLER,

Judge.

Decision Denying Motion for New Trial by Judge E.vans

(March 19, 1941)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT
I.JAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
R. D. TOBIN, et al,
Plaintiffs,
V8.

UNITED BOND AND FINANCE CO., a corporation,
et al,
Defendants .

.DECISION ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

It has fallen to my lot to review the decision of Judge
Schiller.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the Judge could
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-157not revie\Y his O\Yn decision, and yet the defendants had
a right to move for a ne\Y trial, even though it involved the
reading of a voluminous record, as \Yell as the study of
extended briefs.
The first question that presents itself is this: What
could be accomplished by granting a motion for a new
trial? To say the least it would be tremendously expensive
and result in making a record probably not substantially
different from the one contained in the 1742 page record
already made.

Eventually, I surmise, the case will find

its way to the Supreme Court for review, and there any
doubtful questions may be finally resolved.
But aside from these considerations there seems to
me to be no escape from the findings of Judge Schiller.
Under the present management of the United Bond and
Finance Company it seems entirely improbable that the
stock held by the minority stockholders could ever be of
any value.

The stockholders have not been taken care

of in the way they had a right to expect. When it is considered that the only funds that have been invested are
such funds as have been derived from the proceeds of the
purchase of stock, and when it is considered that all of
these purchases were made at the solicitation of the organizers of the company, it then became the duty of the defendants to safeguard that investment.

This they did not

do. And that brings us to the question as to whether or
not they can obtain redress at law.

I am impressed with
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the statement of the principle cited in the Defendants'
reply brief, McDougal vs. Huntington & Broad Top R. R.
& Co., 147 Atlantic 574.

remedy at law.

There may be theoretically a

I cannot, however, convince myself that

it is adequate.
It is insisted that the receivership is the sole relief
asked. I regard it as ancillary to the accounting, but that
is a questoin which I would prefer to have settled by the
Supreme Court.

There is no doubt that these minority

stockholders are entitled to full redress.

Just what that

may be I am not at this time prepared to say. The receiver
should be called upon to make recommendations and as
soon as the object has been accomplished, the receiver
should be discharged. This. receivership does not contemplate a dissolution, but only necessary readjustments.
We cannot rely upon the individual defendants to bring
this about.

Being in absolute control they can still pro-

ceed to do what they have been doing over a period of years,
destroy the value of the stock in hands other than their
own and at the same time enhance the value of the stock
held by them.

I am assuming that the stock held in the

name of Mrs. Beckstead is in fact owned by the defendant,
W. R. Beckstead.
The motion for a new trial is denied.

P. 0.

EVANS

Judge.
March 19, 1941.
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